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Introduction

For the past several years, the tenants of Camfield Estates, a
public housing project in Boston, have participated in a project
seeking to narrow the “digital divide” between economically
disadvantaged Americans and those with ready access to innovative
1
information technology. The project has provided free computers
and high-speed cable lines wired into the homes of housing project
residents, enabling them to connect to the Internet. The project
anticipates that residents soon will have access to a high-speed Wi-Fi
system that will transmit and receive data from four small over-the-air
2
reception antennas placed atop a building in the development.
Residents may purchase wireless cards for a small fee, and the elderly
will receive cards for free. Residents will be able to log on at no cost
from anywhere within the housing project. The tenants of Camfield
are lucky. They are beneficiaries of the foresight and benevolence of
a landlord who has recognized the importance of affording all people,
regardless of property ownership and wealth, the opportunity to
receive vital technologically-advanced wireless communications
services.
Not every renter is as lucky. For instance, imagine a woman who
rents a unit in a suburban apartment complex. The rates charged by
the local cable television company have steadily increased over the
last few years, while the quality of service she receives has declined.
The tenant wants to subscribe to a satellite television service, which
offers lower prices and a wider range of programming choices. When
service people arrive to wire the apartment and to install a new
satellite dish on her patio, the landlord runs to the apartment waving
a copy of the tenant’s lease agreement in his hand. Apparently, the
lease agreement strictly prohibits the installation of satellite dishes by
the tenant. The tenant is confused when her landlord orders the
service people off of his property. The landlord insists that the tenant
is nothing more than a renter and has no right to install a satellite dish

1. See Donna Rosato, Bringing Free Wireless Access To The People, USA TODAY,
Nov. 18, 2002, at 5E; see also Associated Press, Low-income Housing Goes Wireless (Feb.
24, 2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/02/24/
housing.hotspot.ap/ap/index.html.
2. Wi-Fi is short for “wireless fidelity” and is used to refer to a family of technology
specifying an over-the-air interface between a wireless telecommunications client and a
base station or between two wireless clients. The technology may be used for the provision
of Internet service.
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anywhere on the premises, and any further attempts to do so would
result in a penalty, eviction, and a lawsuit. Even though the tenant
does not own any part of the leased premises, unbeknownst to her,
she probably has the right to install a satellite dish on the patio.
Next, consider a Spanish-speaking family renting a single-family
home in an area serviced by a local cable system that does not carry
any Spanish-language programming. The family learns that a direct
broadcast service provider carries three Spanish-language networks,
and arranges service. After the dish is installed, the family’s landlord
threatens to remove the dish unless the family first removes it,
referencing the family’s lease which prohibits the installation of
satellite dishes on the property. As this article will show, this family
has a powerful tool under federal law.
Finally, imagine a man who rents an apartment in the middle of a
densely populated downtown district. Impressed with available
satellite services, he wishes to subscribe to satellite service and to
install a satellite dish. Unfortunately, because the man’s apartment
does not have a balcony or patio, he may not share the same
protections under federal law. This article suggests that he should.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(the “1996 Act” or the “Act”), which was intended to be landmark
legislation that would change the regulatory landscape of the
communications industry and the delivery of communications and
3
telecommunications services in the United States. Not since the
enactment of the Communications Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”) had
the communications industry undergone broad-sweeping legislative
change addressing the rapidly changing technological and business
4
environment. In Section 207 of the 1996 Act, Congress directed the
Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC” or the
“Commission”) to issue regulations prohibiting restrictions on a
viewer’s ability to receive television broadcast signals, multichannel
multipoint distribution service (“MMDS”), or direct broadcast
5
satellite services (“DBS”) via over-the-air reception devices. The
3. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2000).
4. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
5. Telecommunication Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 207. Section 207 was not codified but
reads in relevant part:
Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall,
pursuant to section 303 of the Communications Act of 1934, promulgate
regulations to prohibit restrictions that impair a viewer’s ability to receive video
programming services through devices designed for over-the-air reception of
television broadcast signals, multichannel multipoint distribution service, or
direct broadcast satellite services.
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Congressional directive to the FCC sought to promote one of the
primary objectives of the 1934 Act, which was “to make available, so
far as possible, to all people of the United States . . . a rapid, efficient,
nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service
6
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”
The 1996 Act also added a new subsection 303(v) to the 1934 Act
“granting the [C]ommission exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
7
provision of direct-to-home satellite services.” In response to this
Congressional directive, on August 5, 1996, the Commission
implemented Section 207 of the 1996 Act by adopting FCC Rule
8
section 1.4000 (the “OTARD Rule” or the “Rule” or “Rule 1.4000”).
The OTARD Rule prohibits governmental and private restrictions
that impair the ability of antenna users to install, maintain, or use
over-the-air reception devices (“OTARDs” or “Section 207
9
Devices”).
The Commission’s initial OTARD Rule prohibited restrictions
“on property within the exclusive use or control of an antenna user
10
where the user has a direct or indirect ownership in the property.” In
other words, it protected those parties seeking to install a reception
device on property, which they in fact owned. In 1998, the
Commission expanded the OTARD Rule to include rental property,
and applied it to installations “on property within the exclusive use or
control of an antenna user where the user has a direct or indirect
ownership or leasehold interest in the property” upon which the

See also 47 U.S.C. § 303(v).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 303.
7. Id. §§ 151, 303(v) (“[T]he term ‘direct-to-home satellite services’ means the
distribution or broadcasting of programming or services by satellite directly to the
subscriber’s premises without the use of ground receiving or distribution equipment. . . .”)
8. Preemption of Local Zoning Regulation of Satellite Earth Stations,
Implementation of Section 207 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Restrictions on
Over-the-Air Reception Devices: Television Broadcast Service and Multichannel Multipoint
Distribution Service, 11 F.C.C.R. 19276 (1996) (“First OTARD Order”); 47 C.F.R. §
1.4000 (2004).
9. 47 C.F.R. § 1.4000. Section 207 Devices or OTARDs include antennas that are
one meter (39.97”) or less in diameter or diagonal measurement and are designed to
receive direct broadcast satellite services, video programming services via multipoint
distribution services, including multichannel multipoint distribution services, instructional
television fixed services, local multipoint distribution services, and television broadcast
signals. The Rule also applies to masts extending no more than 12 feet above the roofline
which are within the exclusive use or control of the viewer.
10. See First OTARD Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 19279, ¶ 5 (The OTARD Rule initially
applied only to property in which the “user” of the satellite services had an ownership
interest. It allowed for two exceptions: (1) clearly defined safety objectives; (2) historic
district preservation.).
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antenna is to be located.11 The OTARD Rule, as amended, permits
persons who lease property—tenants—to install such devices without
obtaining the consent of the landlord or owner of the property.
The extension of the OTARD Rule to rental property has raised
constitutional questions including challenges by property owners,
landlords and various real estate organizations and associations who
argue that application of the OTARD Rule to rental property
constitutes a taking of private property in violation of the Takings
12
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A
few years ago, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of the OTARD Rule
and answered the pointed question of whether the extension of Rule
1.4000 constituted a taking of private property thus triggering the
government’s obligation to compensate the affected property
13
14
owners. The D.C. Circuit declined to find a compensable taking.
Many articles addressing the issue of unconstitutional takings
start with the assumption that property is involved and embark upon
a discussion of whether a taking has in fact occurred. What often is
missing is a discussion of what property right, if any, is actually
involved. In other words, as applied to the FCC’s OTARD Rule, the
takings analysis first must address the precise nature of the tenant’s
and landlord’s property interests. The question becomes whether the
tenant actually has property rights distinct from contractual rights
under a lease. Likewise, the nature of the landlord’s property rights
under a leasehold must be identified. If a tenant does have property
rights, such rights must be clearly identified and balanced against
those of the landlord.
This article agrees that the Commission’s Rule 1.4000 as it
applies to landlords and tenants does not constitute an
11. In the Matter of Implementation of Section 207 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996—Restrictions on Over-the-Air Reception Devices: Television Broadcast, Multichannel
Multipoint Distribution and Direct Broadcast Satellite Services, 13 F.C.C.R. 23874, ¶ 4
(1998) (“Second OTARD Order”). The Second OTARD Order became effective January
22, 1999. In general, however, the Commission has characterized rooftops as a common
area and has excluded rooftops from areas that are within the exclusive use or control of a
tenant. The Commission stated that this amendment to its rules serves two federal
objectives of promoting competition among multichannel video providers and of providing
viewers with access to multiple choices of video programming.
12. The Takings Clause states that “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The OTARD Rule also has raised
Equal Protection, First Amendment, and Due Process questions that are discussed in part
in this article.
13. Bldg. Owners and Managers Ass’n Int’l v. F.C.C., 254 F.3d 89 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
14. Id.
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unconstitutional taking. Although tenants have fewer property rights
than landlords or property owners as they pertain to rental property,
when those rights are balanced against the rights of the property
owner, no compensable taking is found, considering the goals of
Congress and the FCC, and considering policy concerns of fairness.
The FCC struck the proper constitutional balance between the
interests of consumers, property owners, and the business industry by
not extending the Rule to common areas, as such an extension
probably would constitute an unconstitutional taking. The FCC
properly placed the burden on industry to reach consumers not
protected by the Rule by encouraging the development of more
innovative technology and methods of transmission and reception of
communications, video and data services. Rather than burdening the
property rights of owners, it equitably placed the burden on those
who stand to benefit most from the application of Rule 1.4000.
However, this article contends that to fully achieve the goals of
the 1996 Act, the protections of Rule 1.4000 must be extended to
areas outside the exclusive use or control of a rental property lessee.
This article, supports the contention of many proponents of the Rule
that while the FCC’s OTARD Rule is constitutional, Rule 1.4000 has
a number of other shortcomings, the most important of which is that
because the Rule provides only limited opportunities for viewers to
install Section 207 Devices on rental property, the Rule fails to fully
achieve the goals of the 1996 Act of ensuring that service is available
to all Americans. Also, the Rule raises important social and economic
issues. The OTARD Rule fails to reach all people across racial,
ethnic, and economic lines. It fails to go far enough to accomplish the
goal of making OTARD reception available to all consumers. As is
the case in most FCC rulemaking proceedings, the record is very
detailed and most legal arguments are made with great clarity and
specificity. However, while the Commission and certain commenters
identify these issues they fail to fully grasp to gravity of the FCC’s
failure to make the OTARD Rule applicable to all persons,
regardless of property ownership or regardless of access to areas
exclusively within a renter’s control and use on which to install a
satellite reception device.
The FCC’s Rule, as supported by the D.C. Circuit’s holding in
Building Owners and Managers Association Int’l, gives consumers
15
only limited access to receive communications services. However, to
accomplish the goals of Section 207, the Commission must go a step
15. Id.
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further to permit tenants either to place reception devices on areas
beyond their exclusive use or control or to require landlords to
provide satellite video service to tenants within the leasehold. Only
by such an extension of the Rule would there be a full meeting of the
objectives of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which is to prohibit
rules that “impair a viewer’s ability to receive video programming
services through devices designed for over-the-air reception of
television broadcast signals, multichannel multipoint distribution
16
service, or direct broadcast satellite services.”
Since adopting the OTARD Rule, the FCC has often touted a
great “Digital Migration” which refers to the great efforts by
government and industry to deliver a wide range of
telecommunications services such as Wi-Fi, digital television,
broadband and wireless Internet, Voice Over Internet Protocol
(“VoIP”), wireless personal digital assistants (“PDAs”), digital AM
and FM radio, and satellite radio. While broadband television and
cable offer consumers choice and somewhat competitive markets,
many services may be delivered more cheaply and efficiently via
satellites. The Congress should seek to equate the right to receive
telecommunications services to the right to receive other services such
as utilities and postal mail. Therefore, this article contends that the
Commission, courts and legislatures should look to expand the rights
granted to a tenant under a leasehold. By equating the right to
receive telecommunications services to other vital services, we in fact
create an important exemption to a compensable taking. Such an
exemption is necessary in this case because the Commission did as
much as it could constitutionally accomplish because to go further
without such an exemption would implicate the Takings Clause. The
Commission may have such an opportunity to revisit this issue in the
next few years, as some members of Congress have suggested recently
that the Congress will revisit certain portions of the 1996 Act.
Part I of this Article provides an explanation of the background
of Rule 1.4000. It traces the development of Rule 1.4000 from the
Congressional directives in the 1996 Act through the FCC’s
rulemaking proceedings and the FCC’s declaratory rulings. Part II
reviews the practical shortcomings of the Rule. Specifically, this
section contends that the FCC must more adequately address the
technical and practical limitations affecting many rental properties
and the failure of the Rule to encompass all small antennas. Part III
discusses the social and economic issues invoked by the Rule. This
16. 42 U.S.C. § 207.
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section specifically addresses the failure of the Rule to span racial and
ethnic lines, and the failure to adequately address liability allocation
while continuing to promote Congress’ objectives. Parts II and III
review the rulemaking record and address those arguments made by
the Commission and others in the rulemaking proceeding. Part IV
discusses the property rights of tenants and landlords and answers the
question of what property rights, as distinct from contract rights,
landlords and tenants possess with respect to a leasehold. Finally, Part
V addresses the constitutional problems associated with Rule 1.4000,
focusing on takings jurisprudence and examining the long line of
takings cases including the D.C. Circuit’s review of the OTARD
Rule. Additionally, this part reviews cases that have come before the
FCC under this Rule, proposes an expansion of the rights granted to
tenants under the modern leasehold, discusses the acceptable wealth
redistributions between landlords and tenants, and addresses the
FCC’s efforts to fully achieve the goals of the 1996 Act without
triggering constitutional problems.

II. Background of Rule 1.4000
The objective of the 1934 Act, as stated by Congress, was “to
make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United
States . . . a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communications service with adequate facilities at reasonable
17
charges.” In 1996, through a dramatic overhaul of the 1934 Act,
Congress directed the FCC to adopt rules concerning governmental
and nongovernmental restrictions on viewers’ ability to receive video
programming signals from DBS, MMDS—wireless cable providers,
18
and television broadcast stations (“TVBS”). As directed by
Congress, the Commission initiated a rulemaking proceeding, issued a

17. 47 U.S.C. § 151.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 207. Direct Broadcast Satellite (“DBS”) is a term for a satellite which
sends powerful signals to small dishes, typically 18-inch diameter, installed at homes.
Multipoint Multichannel Distribution Service (“MMDS”) is a way of distributing cable
television signals, through microwave, from a single transmission point to multiple
receiving points. Television Broadcast Stations (“TVBS”) are over-the-air radio or
television stations licensed by the FCC or equivalent foreign (Canadian or Mexican)
th
stations. See Harry Newton, NEWTON’S TELECOM DICTIONARY (17 ed. 2001).
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Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,19 and ultimately adopted the
OTARD Rule. The OTARD Rule was designed to further the
objectives of promoting consumer choice and access to an array of
video programming services, as well as fostering a competitive
20
marketplace among providers of these services.
In its First OTARD Order, the Commission stated that, while
Section 207 requires the Commission to prohibit restrictions that
impair viewers’ ability to receive satellite signals, it also permits the
Commission to minimize possible interference that could result from
local and municipal governments as well as homeowners’
21
associations. The Commission stated in its order that “[w]e have
thus attempted to implement Section 207 in a way that produces
greater competition and consumer choice by ensuring viewers’ ability
to receive over-the-air signals, while preserving local control of
22
regulation of safety and historic areas.” The legislative history of
Section 207 states “existing regulation, including but not limited to,
19. In 1986, the Commission adopted a rule restricting potential barriers to the
development of satellite-based residential video programming (Common Carrier Services;
Preemption of Local Zoning and Other Regulation of Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations,
51 Fed. Reg. 5519 (1986)), and in 1996 the FCC promulgated rules to safeguard viewers’
ability to use devices designed for direct broadcast satellite services, television broadcast
services, and multichannel multipoint distribution services (Implementation of Section 207
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Restrictions on Over-the-Air Reception Devices:
Television Broadcast and Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service, 11 F.C.C.R. 6357
(1996); Preemption of Local Zoning Regulation of Satellite Earth Stations, 11 F.C.C.R.
5809 (1996); Preemption of Local Zoning Regulation of Satellite Earth Stations;
Implementation of Section 207 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Restrictions on
Over-the-Air Reception Devices: Television Broadcast Service and Multichannel Multipoint
Distribution Service, 11 F.C.C.R. 19276 (1996) (“First OTARD Order”)), and later
adopted amendments to the Rule (Implementation of Section 207 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996; Restrictions on Over-the-Air Reception Devices:
Television Broadcast, Multichannel Multipoint Distribution and Direct Broadcast Satellite
Services, 13 F.C.C.R. 23874 (1998) (“Second OTARD Order”); Implementation of Section
207 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Restrictions on Over-the-Air Reception
Devices: Television Broadcast Service and Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service,
13 F.C.C.R. 18962 (1998) (“First Order on Reconsideration”); Implementation of Section
207 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Restrictions on Over-the-Air Reception
Devices: Television Broadcast Service and Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service, 14
F.C.C.R. 19924 (1999) (“Second Order on Reconsideration”)).
20. First OTARD Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 19281, ¶ 6.
21. Id., at 19281-82, ¶6.
22. Id., at 19281-82, ¶¶ 5-6; see also Separate Statement of Commissioner Rachelle B.
Chong, available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/cable/orders/1996_WP/fc96328.wp (Aug. 6,
1996) (“[i]n crafting this rule, we have performed a delicate balancing act. On the one
hand, we have weighted the federal interests of ensuring that all consumers have access to
a broad range of video programming services and promoting competition among those
services. On the other hand, we have weighed important local interests in safety and
managing land use in their communities.”).
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zoning laws, ordinances, restrictive covenants or homeowners’
association rules, shall be unenforceable to the extent contrary to this
23
section.” Thus, the Rule prohibits governmental and nongovernmental restrictions that impair the ability of antenna users to
install, maintain, or use Section 207 Devices and, thereby, that impair
the ability of viewers to receive video programming signals from DBS
24
and MMDS providers, and TVBS. The prohibition includes local
zoning, land use, and building regulations. Similarly, the Rule applies
to lease restrictions, homeowner, town home, condominium and
cooperative association rules and bylaws, restrictive covenants, and
25
private deed restrictions.
The Rule provides that a restriction impairs installation,
maintenance, or use of a protected antenna if it: (1) “unreasonably
26
delays or prevents installation, maintenance or use,” or; (2)
“unreasonably increases the cost of installation, maintenance, or
27
use” ; or (3) “precludes reception of an acceptable quality signal” of

23. 104th Congress, 1st Session, Report 104-204, Part 1 at 123-24 (July 24, 1995).
24. First OTARD Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 19279-81, ¶ 5. The Rule became effective on
October 14, 1996. Telecommunication Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 207.
25. See id., at 19279-81, ¶ 5; and see Second OTARD Order, at 23880, ¶ 12-15.
26. See First OTARD Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 19285-87, ¶¶ 14-17. Local restrictions,
both governmental and private, prohibiting all antennas are prohibited by the OTARD
Rule. Likewise, governmental and nongovernmental procedural requirements which
unreasonably delay installation, maintenance, or use of an antenna covered by the Rule
are prohibited. Prior approval and permit requirements generally are prohibited as they
cause unreasonable delays in receiving services addressed by the Rule.
27. See id., at 19287-88, ¶¶ 14, 18-19; and see First Order on Reconsideration, 13
F.C.C.R. 18962, ¶¶ 42-45 (1998). Also, the required payment of fees for a permit or for
permission to install covered antennas generally is considered an unreasonable expense
and is not permitted. Also, any governmental or nongovernmental restriction requiring a
viewer to incur additional costs may be unreasonable and thus prohibited. To determine
the reasonableness of a cost, the Commission considers, among other things, the cost of
the equipment and services, and whether similar requirements have been imposed for
comparable items, such as air conditioners, mailboxes, or garbage cans. The Commission
suggests it might invalidate rules requiring expensive landscaping to screen antennas, but
might uphold a requirement to paint an antenna so that it blends into the background,
provided painting the antenna would not interfere with reception or impose unreasonable
costs. The Commission did not adopt a specific formulaic computation.

190

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[26:179

a covered Section 207 Device.28 The OTARD Rule applies to video
reception antennas including direct-to-home satellite dishes that are
29
less than one meter in diameter, TV antennas, and wireless cable
30
antennas.
The Rule excepts certain clearly defined, legitimate safety
restrictions and certain historic preservation restrictions permitting
local governments, community associations, and landlords to enforce
safety and historic preservation restrictions that do not impair the
installation, maintenance, or use of the types of antennas described in
31
the Rule. The Commission in this order stated that safety
restrictions are permitted provided they are necessary to protect
public safety and are no more burdensome than necessary to ensure
32
safety. Examples of valid safety restrictions include fire codes
preventing people from installing antennas on fire escapes, and

28. See First OTARD Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 19288, ¶¶ 14, 20; see also
Telecommunication Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 207. A restriction will be deemed to impair a
viewer’s ability to receive video programming signals if “reception would be impossible or
would be substantially degraded.” Any restriction requiring an antenna to be installed in a
location where the viewer could not receive a clear signal would be prohibited. The
standards are different for devices designed to receive different types of
telecommunications services. For example, in order for a digital satellite antenna to
receive or transmit an acceptable quality signal, the antenna must be installed where it has
an unobstructed, direct view between the transmitting satellite and the reception device.
Digital reception devices are subject to a “cliff effect,” meaning that the transition
between reception of a complete picture and no picture at all occurs almost immediately
as if falling over a cliff. Analog antennas are entitled to be installed in a location as well, if
one is available, that will allow the viewer to receive a reasonable quality signal.
29. See id., at 19295-96, ¶ 32; and see 47 C.F.R 1.4000(a)(1)(i). There is no such size
limitation on satellite dishes located in Alaska.
30. See 47 C.F.R. 1.4000(a)(2) (2004); and see Promotion of Competitive Networks in
Local Telecommunications Markets, Wireless Communications, Association International,
Inc. Petition for Rulemaking to Amend Section 1.4000 of the Commission’s Rules to
Preempt Restrictions on Subscriber Premises Reception or Transmission Antennas
Designed to Provide Fixed Wireless Services, 15 F.C.C.R. 22983, 23027-28, ¶¶ 98-99 (2000)
(“Competitive Networks Order”). The Rule, as amended effective May 25, 2001, makes
the Rule applicable to antennas designed to receive and/or transmit voice and data
services, including Internet access, but not to antennas used for AM/FM radio, amateur or
“HAM” radio, Citizen’s Band (“CB”) radio, or Digital Audio Radio Services (“DARS”);
and see First OTARD Order, at 19294-95, ¶ 30. The Rule does not apply to television
antennas used to receive a distant signal, nor does it apply to very small aperture terminals
(“VSAT”) that transmit information. VSAT is a commercial satellite service that may use
Ku-band satellite antennas less than one meter in diameter. It is not within the purview of
the statute because it is not used to provide over-the-air video programming. VSAT
systems mostly are used for direct transmission of business data from one central location
simultaneously to a large number of receiving points. For example, retail stores use
rooftop VSATs to transmit daily receipts and to receive instructions for sales.
31. See First OTARD Order, at 19290-92, ¶¶ 24, 26.
32. Id. at 19290-91, ¶¶ 24-25.
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restrictions prohibiting the placement of antennas within a certain
proximity of power lines. Similarly, requirements directing the proper
33
method to secure an antenna would be permitted. The safety reason
for the restriction must be specified in the text, preamble, or
legislative history of the restriction, or in a document readily available
34
to antenna users, so as to provide notice of the restrictions.
Historic preservation restrictions are permitted despite any
35
impairment of installation, maintenance, or use. The property must
be included in, or eligible for inclusion on, the National Register of
36
Historic Places. Such historic restrictions, like safety restrictions,
must be no more burdensome than necessary to accomplish the
37
historic preservation goal. The restrictions must be narrowly
tailored, imposing as little burden as possible, and they must apply in
a nondiscriminatory manner as compared to other similarly sized
38
structures. The Commission may grant waivers upon the request of a
39
local government or nongovernmental private entity.
The Commission’s First OTARD Order applied the OTARD
Rule only to property in which the user of the satellite services had “a
40
direct or indirect ownership interest in the property at issue.” The
First OTARD Order failed to address whether the Section 207
prohibition should apply to property such as common areas in
condominium complexes not within the exclusive use or control of a
person with an ownership interest. It also left unresolved the issue of
whether the prohibitions should extend to restrictions on installations

33. Telecommunication Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 207 (2000); 47 C.F.R 1.4000 (2004);
see also First OTARD Order, at 19292, ¶ 25.
34. Telecommunication Act of 1996; 47 C.F.R 1.4000; see also First OTARD Order,
at 19292, ¶ 25; 104th Congress, 1st Session, Report 104-204, Part 1 at 123-24 (July 24,
1995).
35. Telecommunication Act of 1996; 47 C.F.R. 1.4000; see also First OTARD Order,
at 19292, ¶¶26-27.
36. The FCC revised the Rule to conform to the National Historic Preservation Act
of 1966, which defines protected historic properties as “any prehistoric or historic district,
site, building, structure or object included in, or eligible for inclusion on the National
Register.” Telecommunication Act of 1996; 47 C.F.R. 1.4000; see also First OTARD
Order, at 19292, ¶¶ 26-27.
37. Telecommunication Act of 1996; 47 C.F.R. 1.4000; see also First OTARD Order,
at 19292, ¶ 26.
38. Id.
39. A waiver is available in instances in which a local government, community
association, or landlord acknowledges that its restriction impairs installation, maintenance,
or use and is preempted under the OTARD Rule, but believes it can demonstrate “highly
specialized or unusual” concerns. Telecommunication Act of 1996; 47 C.F.R 1.4000; see
also First OTARD Order, at 19309, ¶ 55.
40. First OTARD Order, at 19279, ¶ 5.
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on rental properties.41 In 1998, the Commission issued the Second
OTARD Order expanding the OTARD prohibitions to include
restrictions that impair the ability of antenna users to install,
42
maintain, or use Section 207 Devices on rental property.
Consequently, it is the Commission’s Second OTARD Order that has
been the source of most of the legal challenges to Rule 1.4000.
Specifically, the Second OTARD Order extended its prohibition to
restrictions on rental property within either the exclusive use or
43
control of a tenant who has a leasehold interest in the property. The
Rule applies only to restrictions on property where the viewer has an
44
ownership or leasehold interest with either exclusive use or control.
Pursuant to the Second OTARD Order, the Rule applies to viewers
or consumers who place small antennas on property they own or on
areas within their exclusive use or control on property they rent. The
Rule protects tenants as well as owners of condominiums,
cooperatives, and single family homes, town homes, manufactured
45
homes, and mobile homes. Renters now are able to install Section
207 Devices inside and on rented space on the outside of the building
of the leased premises, such as balconies, balcony railings, patios,
yards, and gardens. The Commission reiterated, in its Second
OTARD Order, that the amended rule promotes competition
46
between video service providers and promotes consumer choice.
41. See generally First OTARD Order.
42. In the Matter of Implementation of Section 207 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996—Restrictions on Over-the-Air Reception Devices: Television Broadcast, Multichannel
Multipoint Distribution and Direct Broadcast Satellite Services, 13 F.C.C.R. 23874 (1998)
(“Second OTARD Order,” and collectively with the First OTARD Order, the “OTARD
Orders”). The Second OTARD Order became effective January 22, 1999. See also First
Order on Reconsideration, In the Matter of Implementation of Section 207 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996; Restrictions on Over-the-Air Reception Devices:
Television Broadcast Service and Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service, 13 F.C.C.R.
18962, 19006-07, ¶ 11 (1998). The Commission also issued an Order on Reconsideration
addressing a number of issues related to Rule 1.4000, including, among other things, the
safety exception, antenna painting requirements, and federal preemption of permit
requirements.
43. See Second OTARD Order, at 23896-97, ¶ 43. The Second OTARD Order
became effective January 22, 1999.
44. “Exclusive use” means an area of the property that only the tenant, and persons
the tenant permits, may enter and use to the exclusion of other residents. See Second
OTARD Order, at 23896-97,¶ 43. The Rule applies to property used for residential as well
as commercial purposes. However, the Rule does not encompass all small antennas. It
applies only to those antennas designed to receive video programming or to receive and/or
transmit data services. In the information age, a lot of other antennas, such as VSAT
antennas also deserve protection.
45. See First OTARD Order, at 19305-07, ¶¶ 49-52.
46. See Second OTARD Order, at 23875, ¶ 1.
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The Commission wrote that the new amendment “strikes a balance
between the interests of tenants, who desire access to more video
programming services, and the interests of landlords, who seek to
47
control access to and use of their property.” The Commission
declined to extend the OTARD Rule to placement of antennas on
common property such as outside walls or restricted areas such as
rooftops, concluding that Section 207 did not authorize the FCC to do
48
so.
The Commission amended its OTARD Rule once again on
October 25, 2000, by extending the application of the Rule to
customer-end antennas that receive and transmit fixed wireless
49
signals. This latest FCC amendment expanded OTARD protections
50
to voice and data services, including the Internet. Expansion of the
protections offered by the Rule to the Internet has important
implications as consumers seek alternatives to traditional dial-up,
51
DSL, or cable modem Internet service. Extension of the OTARD
Rule is imperative to reaching a number of potentially unserved
consumers. Some believe that the FCC’s support of increased
deployment of OTARD devices will combat what industry insiders
refer to as the “last mile bottleneck,” which describes the last link in
the chain of technology that transmits voice and data communications
from a service provider to a customer.
The Commission concluded that prohibitions or restrictions on
antennas installed in or on common areas are enforceable as the Rule
47. Id. at 23875, ¶ 1.
48. Id. at 23875, ¶ 1, 23898, ¶ 45 (1998). In general, however, the Commission has
characterized rooftops as a common area and has excluded rooftops from areas that are
within the exclusive use or control of a tenant; but see In the Matter of Philip Wojcikewicz,
Petition for Declaratory Ruling Under 47 C.F.R. § 1.4000, CSR-6030-0, DA 03-2971 (2003)
(prohibiting a town home association restriction against installing satellite dishes on the
roof where the town home owner did not have exclusive ownership of the roof and even
though adjoining town homes shared a common roof); see also Bldg. Owners and
Managers Ass’n Int’l v. F.C.C., 254 F.3d 89, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Common property refers
to property to which viewers may have access but not possession and exclusive rights to
use or control. Restricted areas are those areas to which viewers generally do not have any
access or possession). For instance, a rooftop may be a restricted area, whereas a
courtyard may be a common area.
49. See Competitive Networks Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 22983 (2000). This amendment
became effective on May 25, 2001. Fixed wireless signals are “commercial non-broadcast
communications signals transmitted via wireless technology to and/or from a fixed
customer location.” Examples include wireless signals used to provide telephone service or
high-speed Internet access to a fixed location. AM/FM radio, HAM radio, CB radio, and
DARS signals are not included.
50. See Competitive Networks Order, at 23027-28, ¶¶ 98-99 (2000).
51. “DSL” stands for Digital Subscriber Line, and is a means of accessing the
Internet via a high-speed telephone connection.
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does not give tenants the right to install devices on common areas
owned by a landlord, community association, or by condominium or
52
cooperative owners. The roof and exterior walls of a building are
53
examples of such common areas. The Commission further opined
that a restriction on installation that bars damage to the structure of
54
the leasehold likely is reasonable under § 1.4000(a). Such a
restriction might include, for example, a prohibition on drilling holes
55
through exterior walls or piercing the roof of a rented house. A
regulation that, on the contrary, prohibits installations that merely
cause ordinary wear and tear, such as marks, scratches, minor damage
56
to carpets, walls and draperies, likely would be unreasonable.
Landlords and community associations may provide service to all
residents via a central or common antenna and may restrict the
installation of individual antennas based upon the availability of this
57
central or common antenna. Restrictions based on the availability of
a central antenna generally will be permissible provided that: (1) the
person seeking service receives the same programming via the central
antenna the person could receive with an individual antenna; (2) the
signal is at least as good as the signal the consumer would receive
from an individual antenna; (3) the costs of using the central antenna
are no greater than the costs associated with using an individual
antenna; and (4) no unreasonable delay in receipt of service would
58
result from the use of a central antenna.

III. The Commission Must Address the Practical
Shortcomings of Rule 1.4000
Section 207 and Rule 1.4000 are outstanding attempts to remove
barriers to access to certain communications services. However, Rule
1.4000 fails to fully satisfy the goals of Section 207 of the 1996 Act.
Many commenters recognize the importance of applying the OTARD
Rule to rental property, but most miss the fact that even though the
52. See Second OTARD Order, at 23893, ¶ 35.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id., ¶ 32.
56. See id., at 23891, ¶ 32, n.81.
57. See id., at 23901-02, ¶ 49.
58. See First Order on Reconsideration, 13 F.C.C.R. 18962, ¶¶ 88-89. The
Commission cautioned that community associations may not use dishonest or delay tactics
designed to deter or delay a viewer’s ability to receive video programming by, for
example, stating an intention to install a common antenna but not taking any efforts
toward that goal and never following through on the promise, and prohibiting tenants
from installing their own antennas. See also Second OTARD Order, at 23902, ¶ 49.
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Rule was extended to apply to renters, it fails to adequately reach all
tenants. While the Rule makes satellite reception available to a
number of consumers, it fails to reach a large percentage of those
consumers who lease their residences and who do not have within
their exclusive use or control an area upon which to install an
otherwise protected Section 207 Device. The Rule fails to afford the
same opportunities to everyone who rents rather than owns property.
Not all consumers who rent have an exclusive use or control area on
which to install a dish, and therefore do not have the same level of
choice as do consumers who own property. Because the FCC declined
to apply Rule 1.4000 to common areas and roofs, and because the
FCC declined to require landlords to provide Section 207 reception
capabilities to tenants, the Rule falls short of making “available, so
far as possible, to all people of the United States . . . a rapid, efficient,
nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service
59
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges . . . .” and of ensuring
that consumers have access to a broad range of video programming
60
and other services.
The commenters in the rulemaking proceeding have identified a
number of practical considerations of placing devices on common or
61
restricted access property. For instance they correctly identify some
of the problems which may arise where there are numerous antennas
installed on a property, including concerns about maintenance
obligations, safety and insurance and liability allocation, the ability of
property owners and landlords to adequately control the operations
62
of their property, and conflicts between the Rule and its policies
with the policies and requirements other laws such as U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development Section 8 public
63
The
Independent
Cable
&
housing
requirements.
Telecommunications Association, a trade association representing
cable companies, asserts that implementation of the OTARD Rule is
problematic in part because it fails to address aesthetic concerns,
59. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
60. First OTARD Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 19281, ¶ 6.
61. Second OTARD Order, 13 F.C.C.R. at 23890, ¶¶ 30-32, 46, citing Comments of
National Multi Housing Council, American Seniors Housing Association, National
Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (“NAA”), Community Associations
Institute (“CAI”), National Association of Home Builders (“NAHB”) available at
www.fcc.gov.
62. Second OTARD Order, 13 F.C.C.R. at 23900, ¶ 46. Some states might treat
reception equipment as fixtures that once installed belong to the landlord.
63. Second OTARD Order, 13 F.C.C.R. at 23900, ¶ 46, citing Reply Comments of
NAHB at 18-19, available at www.fcc.gov.
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involves the FCC in the cumbersome details of landlord-tenant
relationships, and gives tenants an almost unrestricted right to install
64
satellite dishes on their leaseholds. Nevertheless, a balancing of
these practical considerations against the rights of tenants to have
access to satellite service tips the scale in favor of tenants.
The OTARD Rule fails to go far enough. The most identifiable
problem is that it is virtually impossible for a resident to install a
satellite dish in accordance with the OTARD Rule if a tenant does
not have a distinct and properly situated balcony, terrace, or porch
extending from their individually-leased unit and have exclusive use
or control of that area. In most areas of North America, satellite
signals cannot be received if the satellite dish does not face the
southwestern sky, or if anything such as a building, hill, or tree
65
impedes the path between the satellite dish and the satellite. In other
words, if a tenant lives facing the northeast sky, the viewer probably
cannot receive service, yet the landlord need not provide a place
elsewhere on the property to which the tenant viewer may attach a
satellite. The OTARD Rule does not require a property owner to
provide a place for a tenant to install a Section 207 Device if the
tenant does not have an exclusive right to use or possess that portion
of the property. The statute also fails to authorize the Commission to
require landlords to purchase and install video programming
66
devices. Congress, in Section 207, does not direct the Commission to
exercise affirmative power to compel property owners to provide
reception devices or to provide any type of cable or to provide any
67
type of cable or satellite services to their tenants. Nor does the Rule
permit tenants to install dishes on other areas of property such as
courtyards or rooftops. The Rule should affirmatively require
landlords to provide a place for tenant viewers to install covered
antennas particularly when the viewer does not have exclusive use of
the area from which the appropriate signal may be received.
Because of the rapid pace at which technology changes, one
might question whether any substantial amount of time should be
devoted to this issue. It is true that despite the periodic economic
64. Comments of Independent Cable & Telecommunications Association, May 6,
1996, at 7, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=
pdf&id_document =1606000001.
65. See Larry Kessler, The Do’s and Don’ts of Satellite Dishes; Learn the Locations
Limitations and Installation Regulations for Satellite Dishes in Your Community; Taking
Back Control, Practical Matters, UNITS, Apr. 1, 2002.
66. See Second OTARD Order, 13 F.C.C.R. at 23877, ¶ 7.
67. See Kessler, supra note 65. See also Second OTARD Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 23877,
¶ 7.
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downturns in the technology sector, things can and often do change
very quickly. Perhaps reception devices might get smaller thus
proving less of an intrusion, and perhaps mooting this discussion.
Also, emerging technologies could also render satellite service
obsolete. An inevitable mooting of this discussion of the current
OTARD Rule most likely would please the FCC, as such a mooting
would be evidence that the free market system has worked to resolve
what otherwise could present a perplexing constitutional issue. One
of the best aspects of the Commission’s decision is that it places the
onus of resolving the constitutional takings question on those in the
telecommunications and communications industry rather than on the
property owners and homeowners’ associations. The FCC’s and D.C.
Circuit’s decisions force industry to develop more advanced
technology rather than administratively or judicially placing the
burden on property owners to provide service to tenants or to permit
tenants to occupy space beyond the tenant’s exclusive use or control.
The introduction of more efficient and effective technology benefits
everyone in society.
Despite the shortcomings of the Rule, based on constitutional
law takings jurisprudence, the FCC struck the correct balance of the
rights of all parties involved. However, because of the different means
of regulating cable companies and satellite service providers, the FCC
must do more to level the playing field between the different modes
of communication. As a practical matter satellite service providers
cannot even tap into many Multi-Dwelling Unit (“MDU”) or
apartment markets. Until the playing field is leveled, there will not be
true
competition
in
television,
Internet,
and
other
telecommunications markets. As of year-end 2002, DirecTV, a
subsidiary of Hughes Communications, Inc., was the largest DBS
provider in the United States and Latin America, with 11.2 million
subscribers in the U.S. and 1.6 million customers in twenty-eight
68
Latin American and Caribbean markets. It provides video and
bundled global satellite-based broadband service including more than
69
thirty Spanish language special interest channels.
Currently, Comcast is the largest cable provider in the United
States, providing analog video, digital cable, high-speed Internet, and

68. See Form 10-K Annual Report of Hughes Communications, Inc., at 7 (2003),
available at www.shareholder.com/Common/Edgar/944868/950168-03-639/03-00.pdf.
69. See id. at 10-11.
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telephone service.70 AT&T also is among the world’s communications
leaders, providing voice, data, and video communications services. It
provides domestic and international long distance, regional and local
communications services, cable broadband television and Internet
communications services to approximately 40 million homes in the
71
United States. Although DirecTV, Comcast, and AT&T provide
services via different means—video programming and data services
via satellite versus video programming and data services via
72
broadband cable—they are competing for the same customers.
Comcast and AT&T, however, have the benefit of providing a widely
available, established, and popular service and of enjoying the status
of providing a service that is deeply entrenched in many American
households including apartment complexes. For years, cable
companies have been the exclusive providers of cable service to
multi-unit complexes. Comcast’s and AT&T’s cable operation is
largely unregulated by the federal government, as cable regulation is
largely left to local authorities. Conversely, the FCC regulates
DirecTV by rules governing the placement of reception antennas.
Moreover, DirecTV and other satellite service providers claim that
they are shut out from servicing a large number of consumers because
many exclusive contracts negotiated between property owning
landlords and cable operators preclude DirecTV’s access to these
73
properties and the tenants dwelling therein.
Some have argued that the FCC could seek alternative measures
to eliminate these barriers of access to better technology by
prohibiting exclusive contracts between landlords and cable television
companies because the use of exclusive contracts by incumbent cable
television operators has been deemed a method of unfair competition
which prevents competitors of cable operators from providing service
74
to subscribers—particularly those who dwell in MDUs. They
correctly claim that cable operators’ market power to obtain exclusive
70. See, Form 10-K Annual Report of Comcast Corporation, at 4 (2002), available at
www.cmcsk.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=118591&p=irol-reportsAnnual#.
Comcast
has
approximately 21.3 million subscribers, including approximately 6.6 million who subscribe
to digital cable television, and 3.6 million who subscribe to high-speed Internet service.
71. See, http://www.att.com/att.
72. See id. See also Form 10-K Annual Report of Hughes Communications, Inc., at 8
(2003), available at www.shareholder.com/Common/Edgar/944868/950168-03-639/0300.pdf.
73. See, e.g., Comments of DirecTV, Inc., at 13 (Sept. 27, 1996), available at http://
gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1698920001.
74. See Comments of DirecTV, Inc., at 19 (Sept. 27, 1996), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1698920001.
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contracts with landlords and their possible abuse of this power is the
type of barrier to competition Congress and the Commission continue
75
to seek eliminate. Eliminating exclusive contracts is one means of
achieving this goal, but as it relates to the OTARD Rule, and the
receipt of satellite services, such a ban on exclusive contracts, does
not get us to a full realization of the goals of the 1996 Act. Fostering
competition is only one side of the equation. On the other side of the
equation, are consumers who must be able to take full advantage of
the services that are offered in the marketplace. As the OTARD Rule
currently applies, not all renters have the ability to install satellite
dishes or to receive service due to practical problems of placement,
not to mention the high cost of and the financial obstacles to installing
and maintaining advanced telecommunications services.
Installation of common antennas or the creation of community
technology centers have been identified as solutions to the problem of
technology access by those who cannot afford a computer and
76
Internet access. Access to such common antennas solves the
problems of access to information by dwellers of MDUs by making
available more service than the dwellers may have had otherwise.
However, the availability of common antennas to be shared by all
tenants in a property, still deprives a tenant of the same opportunities
for choice that property owners have.
Therefore, even though Rule 1.4000 and Section 207 are wellintentioned attempts to make satellite service available to all
Americans, they fall far short of this goal and fail to adequately
address the practical concerns of consumers who rent their residences
as well as those concerns of property owners who rent property. The
Rule simply does not go far enough.

IV. Social and Economic Implications of Rule 1.4000
The goal of the FCC is to act in the public interest, convenience
77
and necessity. The FCC is obligated to represent the interests of the
entire public which includes private individuals or the public at large
as well as the interests of business entities which offer communication
services. Just what constitutes the public interest is a dynamic
concept, constantly evolving over time as technology as well as

75. See id.
76. RANETA LAWSON MACK, THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: STANDING
INTERSECTION OF RACE & TECHNOLOGY 170 (2001).
77. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).

AT

THE

200

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[26:179

industry and consumer needs change.78 The “public” in question is
comprised not only of service providers but also the general public—
including, in this case, the general television viewing public and
wireless Internet users. To fully evaluate the OTARD Rule, several
questions should be addressed such as “What is the public interest,
and is it being served?” and “Is this regulation simply a taking for
private use?” Congress directed the FCC to promulgate a rule that
removes restrictions that impair a viewer’s ability to receive video
programming services through OTARDs. The FCC seeks to achieve
its goals by promoting competition among providers resulting in
choice to consumers, which facilitates the receipt of important
services and information by consumers, including urban apartment
dwellers who are currently less protected that others in America.
However, the interests of market participants and consumers
often are at odds. For example, telemarketing companies make
money by contacting as many consumers as possible and convincing
them to buy a certain product or service. On the other hand,
telemarketers pose a huge inconvenience to consumers, and therefore
the federal government has an interest in limiting their ability to
contact consumers. Acting in the public interest necessitates a
balancing of interests of service providers and consumers. But more
importantly, courts must balance the rights of communications service
providers, consumers, as well as property owners. With respect to the
OTARD Rule, consumers and service providers have some shared
interests that conflict with those of property owners—particularly
those owners who rent their property to others. The 1996 Act
guarantees such providers the opportunity to compete, albeit, not the
79
right to do so. Tenants have a First Amendment right to receive
communications, and property owners have a right to exclude others
80
from their property. However, no property rights are absolute. The
81
right to receive communications, the property right to exclude, and

78. Karl Manheim, Tenant Eviction Protection and the Takings Clause, WIS. L. REV.
925, 942 (1989).
79. Senator Sam Brownback, Senate Commerce Committee, Finances of Telecom
Companies, C-SPAN (July 30, 2002).
80. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (holding that the First
Amendment protects the right “to receive information and ideas”); Red Lion
Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see also Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994).
81. See id. See also State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (where the New Jersey
Supreme Court recognized migrant workers’ right to be visited by essential service people,
including an attorney and a representative from a nonprofit advocacy group, on the
private property of the workers’ employer).
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the rights of service providers to pursue legitimate business ventures
82
must be balanced.
A. Rule 1.4000 Fails to Reach Viewers Across Racial, Ethnic, and Economic
Lines

The FCC and the commenters in the rulemaking proceeding
generally agree that, on its face, Section 207 applies to all viewers and
does not distinguish between owners and renters or between those
83
residing in single family dwellings and those residing in MDUs.
Additionally, the legislative history suggests that Section 207 applies
84
to all viewers. In its application, however, the OTARD Rule does
not affect all viewers equally. Those who rent their residences must
satisfy certain conditions before they can take advantage of the
protections of the OTARD Rule. Unfortunately, the Rule in its
application does, but should not and need not, impose a digital class
stratification depending upon consumers’ and viewers’ status as
85
property owners and economic status. The term “digital divide”
generally refers to the disparity in access to technology based on
86
economic status. As Professor Raneta Lawson Mack states, this
ever-growing digital divide “has perhaps the greatest potential to
doom the ‘have nots’ to the status of permanent underclass” than any
87
other types of past racial discrimination.

82. See, e.g., id.
83. See Second OTARD Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 23880, ¶ 13; See also, Comments of
DirecTV, Inc., at 6, (Sept. 27, 1996), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1698920001. (By using the term “viewer,”
Congress intended to protect all Americans, not just those who own property). See also,
Reply Comments of DirecTV, Inc. to Further NPRM, at 15 (Oct. 28, 1996), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=171586000
1; see also Reply Comments of DirecTV, Inc. to Further NPRM, Oct. 28, 1996, available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=171586000
1. See also, Comments of DirecTV, Inc., at 8 (Sept. 27, 1996), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=169892000
1 (Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history refers to a viewer’s status as a
homeowner, but refers generally to a “viewer.”).
84. 104th Congress, 1st Session, Report 104-204, Part 1 at 123-24 (July 24, 1995).
85. See, Second OTARD Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 23880, ¶ 13. See also, Reply
Comments of DirecTV, Inc. to Further NPRM (Oct. 28, 1996), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=171586000
1.See also, Comments of DirecTV, Inc., at 4-6 (Sept. 27, 1996) available at http://gullfoss2.
fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1698920001.
86. MACK, supra note 76, at xiii (The term “digital divide” has become the “political
and sociological catch-phrase to describe the growing disparity between the ‘haves’ and
the ‘have-nots’ in the current digital revolution.”).
87. Id.
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The technology covered by the OTARD Rule generally was
conceptualized to facilitate the receipt of television and cable
programming. In addition, the amended OTARD Rule also aids
access to information that serves an important role in the education
of all segments of American society and facilitates the education of
88
those with less means and wealth. More importantly, because the
Commission has extended the OTARD Rule to cover antennas
designed to receive and/or transmit data services, including Internet
access, the problem of the digital divide is compounded by the
inability of those who lack wealth in the form of private real property
ownership to benefit fully from the goals set forth in the Rule. The
problem is compounded because with respect to property ownership
and wealth, those who own property have more wealth than do those
who rent. Those who have wealth have more access to valuable
communications services and technology than those who do not.
Those who have access to communications services are ahead of those
who do not with respect to the ability to keep pace with technological
advances and the competitive economic and educational advantages
afforded those who have access to technology. Those who own their
residences, and therefore have wealth, have more opportunities for
access to communications services and educational growth via Section
207 Devices than do those who rent their residences. The OTARD
Rule, while attempting to level the playing field, does not address this
disparity.
Nothing in the language or the legislative history of Section 207
or the Rule indicates that race was a factor in crafting the scope of the
rights granted to tenants as to the placement of reception devices on
89
leased property. It is fairly clear that the racial effects resulting in the
application and enforcement of the Rule were not made intentionally

88. Id. at 50. (“The Internet and e-commerce show early promise as a playing field
‘leveler’ where entrepreneurial ideas can be realized and wealth can be accumulated in the
form of investment opportunities.”); see also Comments of DirecTV, at 3, Sept. 27, 1996,
available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1698920001.
89. 104th Congress, 1st Session, Report 104-204, Part 1 at 123-24 (July 24, 1995).
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based on race. 90 The scope and application of the Rule present the
problem. By not extending Section 207 to common and restricted
areas, or otherwise providing access to tenants, the Commission is
denying viewers who rent their residences—particularly those
residing in urban areas—the same opportunities to receive important
telecommunications services. Proponents of the Rule correctly point
out that the purpose of Section 207 was and continues to be fostering
competition in the video programming industry, which includes cable
television and satellite television, as well as promoting access to overthe-air programming to as many viewers as possible. DirecTV, in its
filed comments, hits the nail squarely on its head when it argues that
the Commission will not accomplish the policy goals of fostering
competition and making telecommunications services available to all
Americans if its rules, as applied, exclude so many people intended to
91
be protected by the OTARD Rule.
Approximately 33.3 million, or 32 percent, of the American
92
population rent their residents. People of color, particularly Blacks
and Latinos/as, lower-income persons, and single-parent families
comprise a disproportionate percentage of the country’s renters and
93
MDU residents. The proceeding’s commenters recognized this
disparity, but did not adequately address just why this is a problem
worthy of concern. These groups are already those most affected by
the growing digital divide and are at risk of being passed by on the
superhighway of information and social and economic progress, and
therefore, need protection related to their ability to access advanced

90. Second OTARD Order, at 23907 ¶ 61. Rational basis is the correct standard to
apply because there is no suspect classification and no fundamental rights are involved.
Under the rational basis test, a classification need only be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest. The regulation will not be examined under strict scrutiny unless it
can be shown that the disparate treatment of minorities was intentional. A
disproportionate impact on minorities is unconstitutional only if traced to a discriminatory
purpose or intent. Because of the absence of the requisite discriminatory intent, the
statute probably passes constitutional challenge based on a rational basis equal protection
analysis.
91. See Comments of DirecTV, Inc., Sept. 27, 1996, at 6, available at http://
gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1698920001.
92. See United States Department of Commerce News, Census Bureau Reports on
Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, October 28, 2003, available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/q403tab5.
93. See Letter of Congressional Black Caucus, dated July 29, 1996, available at
www.fcc.gov; see also Comments of DirecTV, Inc., Sept. 27, 1996, at 7-9, available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=169892000
1 (There is a disproportionate negative impact on minorities and low-income Americans);
Reply Comments of DirecTV, Inc. to Further NPRM, Oct. 28, 1996, available at http://
gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1715860001.
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technological services. 94 Not only are these groups at risk of being
sped by on the so-called Information Superhighway, significant
segments of these groups are not even packed or prepared to begin
the migration with other Americans to the utopia called the Digital
Age. Meaningful access to and the skills to use advanced technology
in this country and in the global economy as a whole are as essential
to economic survival as having access to transportation to work,
having the ability to read and write, and having access to schools and
a quality education. In fulfilling its obligations to act in the public
interest, the FCC must continue to take efforts to insure that all
Americans, regardless of race and economic status, have access to the
essential vehicles providing the transportation to the Digital Age.
Leaseholds often are subject to many non-negotiable, boilerplate
lease terms skewed in the landlord’s favor. Moreover, tenants have
little to no bargaining power with landlords when entering into a
lease or during the lease term. MDU residents are the viewers most in
need of the kind of protections envisioned by Congress. Thus, the
Commission acted properly in extending the OTARD Rule to rental
property, but because the Rule limits the access of renters only to
areas within their exclusive use or control, the current rule potentially
will widen the disparity between the haves and the have-nots. In its
application, the Rule inflicts a disproportionate hardship on poorer
Americans who cannot afford to own their own homes and, therefore,
must live in dwellings without a proper area on which to install a
reception device.
As of 1996, only 44.1 percent of Black Americans, 42.8 percent of
Latino/a Americans, 51.6 percent of Native Americans, and 50.8
percent of Asian Americans owned their residences, compared to
95
71.7 percent of white Americans. By 2002 things had improved only
slightly. As of 2002, homeownership rates were 67.9 percent for all
Americans, 47.3 percent for Black Americans, 48.2 percent for
Latino/a Americans, 54.6 percent for Native Americans, and 54.7

94. U.S. Department of Commerce data from 2001 indicated that 78.9 percent of
people in families making $75,000 or more per year had access to the Internet, compared
to 25 percent of people from households earning less than $15,000 per year. See also
Comments of DirecTV, Inc., Sept. 27, 1996, at 14, available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1698920001.
95. U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership Annual Statistics:
1996. Homeownership was 65.4 percent overall in the U.S. in 1996; see also U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and
Research, U.S. Housing Market Conditions, Second Quarter 2001: National Data, available
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/q403tab5.
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percent for Asian Americans, compared to 74.5 percent for white
96
Americans. In America, property ownership is the most important
avenue to economic security and racial equality. Unfortunately,
property ownership historically was denied to and continues to elude
the majority of African Americans, Latino/a Americans and the
97
poor. Equally unfortunate it is that the OTARD Rule does not go
far enough to bridge the divide between the haves and have nots with
respect to access to advanced technology. Immigrants and non-whites
are more likely to rent for a variety of reasons that may include, for
instance, lack of sufficient savings for a down payment or inability to
secure credit. Because this segment of the population is more likely to
rent, but must keep pace with the train chugging toward the Digital
Age, these individuals should be protected. In theory, Rule 1.4000
serves this purpose but fails, in practice, to fully achieve the laudable
goals of the 1996 Act.
While the Rule as initially enacted applied only to the receipt of
video programming services, it has since been expanded to include
data services including the Internet. It is crucial that all Americans,
regardless of socio-economic status, have access to the Internet and
the underlying infrastructure that makes such receipt possible, and
that the market for the provision of such services is competitive
including as many service providers as the market will bear.
Currently, only 23.6 percent of Black Americans and 23.6 percent of
Latino/a Americans have access in their households to the Internet,
as compared to 46.1 percent of white Americans and 56.8 percent of
98
Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders. Professor Mack highlights
these statistics as one of the bitter ironies of the digital divide—that
those groups that could most benefit from the informational
resources and convenience afforded by computers and Internet access

96. U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership Annual Statistics:
2002. Homeownership was 67.9 percent overall in the U.S. in 2002, available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/q403tab5.
97. MACK, supra note 76, at 41. Mack suggests that property ownership, the “most
important avenue to economic security and racial equality, had been effectively foreclosed
to the former slaves” because slaves and their African American descendants either could
not acquire land at all or faced substantial impediments in doing so.
98. Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S.
Census Bureau, Home Computers and Internet Use in the United States, August, 2000,
Issued September, 2001, Table A, Households with Computers and Internet Access by
Selected Characteristics, August, 2000.
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are precisely the groups that are lagging behind.99 Undoubtedly, the
disparities in the statistics are even more shocking when more
advanced technology such as Wi-Fi and other wireless and high-speed
and digital services are taken into account.
Wi-Fi and high-speed broadband Internet access as well as other
advanced personal technological services can no longer be viewed as
luxuries available only to the wealthy or those with sufficient
disposable monthly income to pay for these services. In more
technologically advanced countries such as Japan, wireless use is
nearly as common as use of the old-fashioned landline telephone. The
ability to obtain information on the Web necessarily narrows the
information gap between those of means and the more economically
challenged. Surfing the Web using slow traditional dial-up modems is
sufficiently frustrating and discouraging to test the patience and
perseverance of a person with the traits of the Biblical figure Job.
Meaningful access to the Internet and similar services can only be had
via high-speed cable or DSL lines, Wi-Fi, or other satellite services.
The Commission and Congress must develop methods of removing
financial, geographical, and regulatory impediments to access.
Minorities not only are more likely to live in an MDU or rented
property, but those who do also are more likely to live in an MDU or
rental property without a patio or balcony constituting a part of their
leaseholds. MDUs constitute a significant portion of all housing units
in the United States. Without such an exclusive area, the affected
tenants would have no outside access from which to receive a satellite
signal. Minorities and people of color also are highly likely to live in
densely populated inner cities that cannot easily receive a sufficient
direct and unimpeded satellite signal or in remote rural areas with
few broadband alternative and often limited resources to afford
today’s modern day necessities. Recently, the Commission has
expressed great interest in bringing affordable broadband services to
underserved remote and rural areas via satellite technology. Such
technology, the Commission hopes, will enhance the lives of ruraldwelling Americans by making available distance learning, health
care, public safety enhancements, entertainment, and of course
widespread Internet access. While the agency’s focus on rural areas is
much needed, the Commission must not overlook underserved urban
areas in the process.
99. MACK, supra note 76, at 36. Mack states that “[w]hile computers and the Internet
are certainly no panacea for all of society’s ills, these technological resources do have
demonstrated potential to assist people in developing and improving their skills,
knowledge, marketability and income.”
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Additionally, the Commission in its OTARD Orders grossly
understates the relative importance in today’s society of satellite
service in the provision of television, voice, and data services. Courts
have failed to identify why OTARDs receive greater protection than
other tenant activity such as the placement of laundry, bicycles, and
grills in areas within the exclusive use or control of a tenant, but less
protection than mail service and the receipt of utilities. Under the
current law, a rule prohibiting satellite dishes is impermissible, but
rules prohibiting these other items and uses are permissible. The right
to receive telecommunications services and the right to install devices
which make receipt possible are much more important and than the
right to hang out the laundry or to grill steaks on the patio. In today’s
technological environment, access to telecommunications is essential.
It is obvious that the import of the Rule reaches beyond merely
protecting the ability of tenants to watch television. Meaningful
access to the Internet is a critically important aspect of life today. The
Internet is used to access job postings, to learn how to write a resume
and to send it to possible employers, to get driving directions or
public transportation routes to get to a job interview, to access
information on what to wear and how to conduct oneself during that
interview, to access information on negotiating a salary, to find out
how to participate in an employer-sponsored retirement plan, to
access information on quality child care, and so on and so on. The
information available on the Internet is endless. The services
accessible via Section 207 Devices, including access to the Internet
and VoIP, have begun to occupy a place in our everyday culture as
important as mail service and utility service. While the decisions of
the Commission and the D.C. Circuit make the claim by implication,
100
this rationale should have been clearly stated. The Commission’s
action begs the question of whether the right to receive
telecommunications services should be on parity with the right of a
property owner to exclude others. Ultimately, society will make a
value judgment about the relative importance of the services received
via satellites and how important it is for tenants and those of lesser
101
means to receive these services and related information. Making
video programming available to MDU residents via satellite service
protects these viewers’ First Amendment rights to receive
100. See Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass’n Int’l v. F.C.C., 254 F.3d 89 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
101. See, e.g., Shack, 277 A.2d at 303-04 ( holding that a private property owner’s right
to exclude was outweighed by isolated migrant workers’ right to receive important
information and to receive visits by essential service providers); see also Red Lion
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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information, a right the Supreme Court has held to be
102
“paramount.” Making access to advanced technology such as the
Internet available to all MDU residents is even more important.
The latest conflicts have been between the desire of recent
immigrants to receive native-language programming, which can only
be received on special dish networks, and the right of landlords to
103
limit the number of dishes residents of a rental unit may install.
America is a land of immigrants, and consequently, is, and has been,
home to many persons who do not speak English as their primary
104
language. At least 200 different languages and dialects are spoken
105
by New York school students. Data collected in October 2002 for
the Public School Bilingual Census for the State of Illinois revealed
more than 124 languages spoken by students in the state’s schools,
with more than 91, or 73 percent, of those languages represented in
106
Chicago’s public schools. More than 110 different languages and
107
dialects are spoken in Massachusetts. At least 26 languages are
spoken in Louisville, Kentucky, a significantly smaller Midwestern
108
city with a population of nearly 700,000.
The free market will inevitably, through demand by foreignspeaking residents, create a market for more foreign-language
programming and stations devoted entirely to foreign-language
programming—not only for entertainment purposes, but also for
important news programming. The cable companies in most large
cities have responded to this changing demographic distribution by
carrying a variety of foreign-language programming. Likewise,
satellite service providers also are responding, albeit at a pace
handicapped by the inability to reach all viewing consumers. Because

102. See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 762-63.
103. Pamela McKuen, It Goes With the Territory; Pesky Issues Cloud an Otherwise
Sunny Climate for Condos, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 5, 2002, at C1.
104. U.S. Census Bureau statistics indicate that in 2000, 11.1 percent of the population
was foreign born, and 17.9 percent spoke a language other than English at home.
105. See Directory of Languages Spoken by Students of Limited English Proficiency in
New York State Programs, (New York State Education Department 1997).
106. See Public School Bilingual Census Summary: 2002-2003, (Illinois Latino Council
on Higher Education 2003), available at http://www.ilache.com/PSBCSummary03.pdf.
107. See 1998 Bilingual Students in Massachusetts Public Schools: Students Whose
Primary Language is not English (PLINE) (Massachusetts Department of Public Health,
Bureau of Family & Community Health, Office of Refugee & Immigrant Health,
Massachusetts Department of Education, Accountability and Evaluation Services 1998).
108. BEYOND MERGER: A COMPETITIVE VISION FOR THE REGIONAL CITY OF
LOUISVILLE, (The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy 2002)
(citing U.S. Census Bureau statistics); see also WHAS-3 News, September 21, 2002, 6:00
p.m.
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consumer choice and competition are goals of the FCC, its rules must
ensure that such programming can reach all Americans regardless of
race, ethnicity, or spoken language.
The tragic terrorist attacks on Washington, D.C. and New York
City on September 11, 2001, underscored the importance of the
ability of news and public safety information and instructions to be
communicated to the public. The ongoing security efforts of the
nation rely in large part upon the ability to get important information
to the American public via all forms of media and in as many
languages as are necessary to inform the public adequately. To date,
with some exception, most newscasts are delivered in English. With
changing demographics and in light of the interest of national security
and the safety of citizens, non-citizen residents, and visitors to our
country, broadcasts in foreign languages are needed and soon will be
demanded. Due to the limited availability of traditional television
broadcast licenses and therefore limited broadcast opportunities, any
emerging foreign-language programming more likely than not will be
provided via cable or some type of wireless satellite service. To
complicate matters, the tenant may not be able to obtain all of his or
her desired foreign-language programming from one single provider.
Consequently, a tenant may desire a traditional broadcast antenna,
cable wiring, and one or more satellite dishes.
Interestingly, the Commission declined to make the OTARD
109
Rule applicable to traditional college dormitories. While one might
argue that this decision creates an unfortunate result because college
students cannot install satellite dishes and take advantage of the
choices in the telecommunications marketplace. Any negative impact
on college students is not as problematic as is the effect on minorities
and lower income persons because most college campuses provide
high-level and high-quality telecommunications services, such as highspeed Internet connections and cable television, to its students either
in each individual dormitory room, a centralized room in the
dormitory, or at some other centralized location or locations on
campus. Also, college campuses are themselves repositories for
information and knowledge. Therefore the problems of isolation and
barriers to access to information are less troublesome in the college
or university environment. Additionally, colleges have more of a
parental relationship to their students than do ordinary landlords.
109. Second OTARD Order, at 23889, ¶ 173, n. 73. The Rule would apply where there
is more of a typical landlord-tenant relationship between the college or university and the
resident. The Commission suggests that the Rule would apply where the institution leases
a property to a faculty member.
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Obviously, no parent must provide his or her children with a panoply
of telecommunications services if the parent chooses not to.
B. Solutions to the Problem of Liability Allocation

Application of the Rule actually may pit poor landlords against
poor tenants more so than it pits other landlords and tenants against
each other. The OTARD Rule is wrought with shortcomings as to
allocation of liability for property and personal damage as well as the
resolution of disputes arising therefrom. The Rule is not clear about
who should bear the costs associated with property damage and
personal injuries resulting from the installation of Section 207
Devices. The parties would have to resort to traditional tort law and
contract law principles to resolve such disputes. The Rule does not
make clear whether a landlord is compelled to accept liability for or
110
indemnify against harm or injury to property and to persons. If so,
the Rule’s application might amount to required acquiescence and
therefore present a takings problem. Property owners who rent to
low-income persons already are limited in their ability to charge
market-based rents. Additionally, they may be limited by law or by
the rental housing market in the amount of security deposits they can
require new residents to pay. The costs of making basic repairs and
conducting basic maintenance on a low-cost MDU or single family
dwelling generally is about the same as with any other property.
Consequently, lower income landlords may see the OTARD Rule as
a disincentive to maintain the rental property because the additional
costs of insuring against liability for injuries sustained to property and
persons resulting from the installation of satellite dishes outweigh any
economic benefits they receive. Consequently, low-cost or low-rent
MDUs may fall further into disrepair as landlords may be forced to
choose between obtaining insurance against personal liability and
performing regular maintenance, improvements, and renovations.
Additionally, the property values of low-cost or low-rent MDUs may
further decline due to the poor aesthetics resulting from the
haphazard, scattered, and poor installation of satellite reception
devices.

110. See id. at 23902, ¶ 50. Under the Doctrine of Waste, a landlord can bring an
action for waste in order to recover for permanent injury and for material damages to the
property, but not for ordinary wear and tear. See also Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436
(N.J. 1980) (where a landlord bore responsibility for personal injuries occurring on the
landlord’s property due to the landlord’s failure to provide adequate security); Asper v.
Haffley, 458 A.2d 1364 (Pa. 1983) (holding that a landlord would be liable for physical
harm suffered by a tenant due to a dangerous condition).
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To address the problem of liability allocation, the FCC or
Congress could establish a fund similar to the Universal Service Fund,
which subsidizes the provision of telecommunications service to rural
111
and underserved areas. This “OTARD Fund” could be available to
reimburse property owners for otherwise unreimbursed costs of
maintenance and repair to the common areas on which Section 207
Devices are installed. The OTARD Fund could be used to subsidize
costs not adequately met by security deposits, insurance, or fees and
penalties paid by tenants. The government could require that all
satellite service providers and Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) pay
this surcharge and allow the ISPs and other service providers to pass
112
this fee or surcharge on to their customers. In this way, all
Americans would be afforded the same opportunities to receive
communications services via Section 207 Devices regardless of their
status as property owners or renters.
The FCC declined to prohibit all safety restrictions imposed by
non-governmental entities, acknowledging that entities such as
homeowners’ associations have legitimate concerns about health and
113
safety. The FCC recognized that homeowners’ associations are in a
unique position to assess the safety needs of their individual
communities, and that to prohibit private safety-based restrictions
114
would preempt state tort liability law. In the First OTARD Order,
the FCC adopted rules that approved the Building Officials & Code
Administrators International, Inc. (“BOCA”) code permit provisions
115
on antenna height and setback requirements. The BOCA requires a
116
permit for antennas exceeding 12 feet in height above a roof. The
Commission’s Order on Reconsideration affirmed that BOCA code
provisions requiring height and setback standards are legitimate
safety objectives, and clarified that the BOCA requirement does not
117
constitute a prohibition of all masts exceeding twelve feet in height.
111. 47 U.S.C. § 254; 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.1-54.904 (most telephone customers pay a small
amount in their monthly telephone bills to fund this service which promotes affordable,
quality telecommunications service to low income, rural, and other high cost areas, as well
as schools and libraries).
112. Public and private partnerships, such as that at Camfield Estates, also have been
suggested as means of expanding home access to computers and the Internet for lowincome families. MACK, supra note 76, at 170.
113. See Second OTARD Order, at 23891, ¶ 31.
114. See id.
115. See First OTARD Order, at 19296-301, ¶¶34-40. The BOCA code is a model
building code published by Building Officials & Code Administrators International, Inc.
116. See id.
117. See First Order on Reconsideration, 13 F.C.C.R. 18962, ¶¶ 27-38 (The BOCA
code “does not constitute a blanket per se prohibition of masts of a particular height.”).
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The FCC disagreed that the BOCA height provision is discriminatory
simply because it requires permits for wireless cable antennas but not
for DBS antennas. The Commission noted an action for
discrimination might be appropriate where a local governmental
authority applies BOCA code safety or permit restrictions to
OTARD devices but not to other devices or items that also pose a
118
safety risk.
An argument could be made that the OTARD Rule actually
increases the value of property because tenants and prospective
buyers will be willing to pay a higher price for the protection provided
by the Rule. This argument, however, fails to account for the fact that
the OTARD Rule applies nondiscriminatorily to all private
restrictions. Because of the protection provided by the Rule,
prospective tenants need not feel obliged to pay a higher rent for
property just for the right to install an OTARD Device. No one
property owner can use the tenant’s opportunity to install a Section
207 Device as a selling point with which to distinguish its property
from other properties. Therefore, a tenant need not pay a higher
price to rent or purchase as no one property owner will offer more
benefits or opportunities to receive satellite service than does the
next. This is, of course, unless a landlord gives tenants easy access to
common areas. Any landlord choosing to grant such unfettered
access, though, would be subjected to greater liability, the allocation
of which the Rule does not adequately address, but seemingly
reserves for resolution by state laws which undoubtedly will produce
diverse outcomes and inconsistent results.
As the Rule currently reads, a landlord in these circumstances
would potentially stand to derive more income from the property in
the form of higher demand for units on the property and the ability to
charge a premium for the access. Generally, all property is equally
situated with the exception of historic landmarks and those properties
qualifying for the safety exception. Despite the fact that an argument
could be made that the Rule effects an increased property value in
some cases, the possibility of a diminution in value is far more likely.
Satellite dishes do detract from the aesthetic appeal of a property,
particularly when more than one device is installed on the same
property or where devices are installed on freestanding masts on the
property grounds. Additionally, the property may suffer severe
damage from improperly as well as properly installed dishes. There is
a clear scenario in which a property’s value may increase after
118. See First OTARD Order, at 19297-98, ¶ 35.
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enactment of the OTARD Rule. The value of a property actually may
increase where a building or buildings on the property are so situated
such that, as compared to other competing properties, a larger
number of the units on the property are oriented toward the
southwest sky. In this case, the landlord’s property would be more
valuable overall because no unit would remain vacant based solely on
this particular issue.

V. The Rights of Landlords and Tenants
Takings analysis involves a balancing of private property rights
119
and more general public interests. This balancing process has been
characterized as “an attempt to reconcile the fundamental tension
between constitutional protection of individual property rights and
120
legislative determinations of public benefit.” The constitutionality
of a governmental regulatory scheme generally is presumed, unless
the impact on private property rights goes too far or if the public
interest is not sufficient enough to tip the scales of justice in favor of
121
the public policy concern. The Commission, as have courts,
recognized the tension between the rights of landlords and tenants,
and the Commission takes great efforts to make the OTARD Rule
applicable to tenants without triggering constitutional problems.
However, the FCC swung the pendulum too much in favor of
landlords. Traditional and modern concepts of landlord-tenant
relationships fail to adequately address changes brought about by
technology and the need to access this technology. These concepts of
property law must be challenged, changed, and rights redistributed in
light of modern advances and the needs of society.
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause provides “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
122
compensation.” In the case of the OTARD Rule, the claims of
unconstitutional takings have come from property owners, landlords,
and homeowners’ associations who claim that the interests they have
in their properties have been unconstitutionally taken without just
123
The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the
compensation.
119. See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) (private and public
interests must be balanced in a takings analysis).
120. Manheim, supra note 78, at 978.
121. Id. “[I]f either the public interest is ill-served or the individual impact too great,
the balance would theoretically tip against the validity of law.”
122. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
123. See, e.g., Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass’n Int’l v. F.C.C., 254 F.3d 89, 91 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).

214

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[26:179

government from taking private property for public use in exercise of
its police powers—it simply prohibits taking private property without
124
Therefore, to successfully assert that the
just compensation.
OTARD Rule effects a taking of private property, a landlord or
property owner must identify his or her property rights under a
leasehold. Before a complete Takings Clause analysis can be done, an
examination of the leasehold as a property concept must be made to
determine, define, and characterize the rights of property owners and
landlords under a leasehold as compared to the property rights of the
tenant or lessee.
A. Ancient and Modern Concepts of a Leasehold

While leases today generally are viewed as contractual
125
transactions, leases are grounded in principles of property law. At
common law, estates in land were held by the king and other inferior
126
lords to whom estate owners had certain obligations. The landlord
had the obligation to give the tenant a legal right to possession, and in
127
some jurisdictions, actual possession. In addition, the lord impliedly
promised that the tenant would have “quiet enjoyment” of the leased
128
premises. This promise meant that during the lease term the
tenant’s possession would be free from interference by the landlord,
or by third persons acting under the landlord’s authority, or by the
129
holder of a paramount title. Under ancient property concepts, a
130
leasehold was seen as a conveyance of a real property interest.
Because a lease originally was considered a complete conveyance of
124. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 194-95 (1985) (“If the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining
compensation, and if resort to that process ‘[yields] just compensation,’ then the property
owner ‘has no claim against the Government’ of a taking.”); Gulf Power Co. v. United
th
States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11 Cir. 1999) (“The fact that the Act’s mandatory access
provision effects a taking of private property does not, by itself, make it
unconstitutional.”).
125. See, e.g., Beckett v. City of Paris Dry Goods Co., 96 P.2d 122, 124 (Cal. 1939); see
also Realty & Rebuilding Co. v. Rea, 194 P. 1024, 1026 (1920) (a lease is a conveyance as
well as a contract, and landlords and tenants are both in privity of contract and privity of
estate).
126. See 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 39.04 (Thomas Ed. 1994).
127. See, e.g., Mullins v. Brown, 94 N.E.2d 574, 576 (1950); Moore v. Cameron Parish
School Board, 563 So. 2d 347, 348 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Restatement (Second) of Property,
Landlord and Tenant § 6.2 (1977).
128. Id.; and see 1 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 3.06; and see King v. Reynolds, 67
Ala. 229 (1880); West v. Kitchell, 68 So. 469, 470 (Miss. 1915) (a landlord must ensure a
tenant’s right to enjoy leased premises).
129. Id.
130. See id.
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an interest in real property, the law of property rather than the law of
131
contracts governed the duties and obligations of the parties.
The modern relationship between a landlord and a tenant, while
a remnant of feudal English systems of real property ownership, is
132
quite different from that under common law. In reality, a lease is
“both a contract and a conveyance” of constitutionally protected
133
property rights. Because a lease is both a conveyance and a
contract, courts look to both bodies of law to determine the
134
obligations of the parties. Today, leases seldom are seen as
complete conveyances of the underlying property for a specified
135
term.
Under modern law, the lease normally defines the rights of the
136
parties. A lease is an agreement under which an owner of property
gives up possession and use of the property for valuable consideration
and for a definite term, at the end of which, the property owner has
137
the absolute right to retake, control, and use the property. A
leasehold estate is a possessory interest in land that divides the
interests in property between a landlord and a tenant and normally
gives the tenant the right to exclusive possession to a defined area for

131. See, e.g., Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526, 532 (N.J. 1970); and see Mease v. Fox,
200 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Iowa 1972) (under ancient concepts of landlord-tenant law the
tenant owned and occupied the leased premises during the lease term).
132. Manheim, supra note 78, at 978 (citing R. Schoshinski, American Law of
Landlord and Tenant at v. (1980) (“The law of landlord and tenant, which had remained
relatively static for several centuries, has undergone extensive development and
modification.”)); see also John J. Constonis, Presumptive & Per Se Takings: A Decisional
Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 475 (June 1983) (suggesting that a
generalized compensation practice might have overwhelmed the young and developing
country had the label “property” been too liberally applied).
133. See, e.g., Beckett v. City of Paris Dry Goods Co., 96 P.2d 124 ; Stonehedge Square
L.P. v. Movie Merchants, 715 A.2d 1082, 1083 (Pa. 1998) (leases are both conveyances of
property interests and contracts); see also Echo Consulting Services, Inc. v. North Conway
Bank, 669 A.3d 227, 230 (N.H. 1995) (a lease is a contract to be construed in accordance
with the standard rules of contract interpretation and construction); see generally John
Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443, 449-50
(1972) (contract rights have been held to be “property” within the meaning of the takings
clause); and see United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923).
Under these authorities, if the government condemns a leasehold estate outright, the
tenant would appear to be entitled to compensation, whether or not his interest is held to
be a property right at common law.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Beckett v. City of Paris Dry Goods Co., 96 P.2d at 124.
137. See id. (“A lease must include a definite description of the property leased and an
agreement for rental to be paid at particular times during a specified term.”).
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a specified term.138 A tenant typically has a “term of years” entitling
the tenant to possess the property for that term, while title to the
139
property remains vested in the landlord. Landlords give away some
but not all of their ownership interests in property upon leasing to a
140
tenant. A transfer of all rights would be more characteristic of a
conveyance of a freehold estate, such as a fee simple absolute, not a
lease. During the term of the leasehold, the landlord has a
reversionary future interest that will become possessory at the end of
141
the tenant’s lease term.
B.

A Landlord’s Bundle of Rights

Private property rights are not created by the Constitution, but
142
generally are created by state law. The Commission traditionally
relies on state law to address issues and disputes between landlords
143
and tenants.
Ordinarily, the Court goes to great lengths to reject any federal
definition of property. “Property interests . . . are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent sources such as state law.” But, when the Court finds a
state’s definition of property too restrictive, it will apply its own
more protective definition. To some extent, rejection of state
definitions is necessary in order to avoid evisceration of the takings
clause. Without a definition of property having at least minimum
normative dimension, states might be encouraged to defeat
144
protection by tautology.

138. See, e.g., Echo Consulting Services, Inc. v. North Conway Bank, 669 A.2d 227
(N.H. 1995).
139. See 2 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 16.03; see also AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES § 3.2
(Little, Brown and Co. 1952) (the landlord conveying a leasehold estate to a tenant retains
the ownership of the estate, or interest involved, but carves out the present possessory
interest for the tenant).
140. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 529-30 (1992) (where a landlord
retained the right to sell the property leased to a tenant); 4 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 126, § 39.03 (by leasing property to a tenant, a landlord does not
give away all ownership interest in the property, otherwise, such the transaction would not
be a lease but a sale or gift of the entire estate).
141. 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 126, § 39.03.
142. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
143. See Second OTARD Order, at 23890, ¶ 31.
144. See Manheim, supra note 78, at 986-87; see, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding that
definitions of property come not from the Constitution but are based in state law);
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980); United States v. Powelson,
319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)
(property is defined by state law).
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Property ownership often is characterized by a bundle of
individual rights that together can be described in terms of a “bundle
145
of rights” or a “bundle of sticks.” Landlords, as well as tenants, have
a distinct bundle of rights under a leasehold. That tenants have
constitutionally protected rights has been found in other contexts as
146
well, such as when leased property is taken in eminent domain.
Property ownership does not confer the absolute right to do whatever
the owner wishes to do on or with that property, but property
ownership is characterized by a fuller bundle of sticks than are other
types of property interests such as easements, leases, and life estates.
A landlord or property owner’s bundle of rights includes the rights to
exclude, use, control, dispose of, possess, and derive income from the
147
property. The right to exclude is widely recognized as “one of the
most essential [and treasured] sticks in the bundle of rights that are
148
commonly characterized as property.”
The bundle of rights associated with property ownership can be
severed, meaning it is possible for an owner to give away one or more
149
sticks and retain the others. Thus, while clearly, it is important to
ask “who is the owner of the property?” it is equally important to ask
“the owner of what?” because any parcel of property may have more
than one owner, in the sense that each holds a different stick or set of
150
sticks in his or her respective bundle of rights.
By leasing property to a tenant, the landlord grants the tenant
the exclusive right to possess as well as a non-exclusive right to use
151
and control the property. The landlord retains the right to dispose
of and the right to derive income from the property. But more
145. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (the
bundle includes the right to possess, use, and dispose of property); and see Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
146. See Victor P. Goldberg, Thomas W. Merrill & Daniel Unumb, Bargaining in the
Shadow of Eminent Domain: Valuing & Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between
Landlord and Tenant, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1083, 1086-87 (April 1987) (citing United
States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 377-78 and Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 377
(1875)). Goldberg, Merrill and Unumb recognize that landlords and tenants both have a
set of distinct property rights.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 378; Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. at 176.
148. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 176; see also Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).
149. See, e.g., Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass’n Int’l v. F.C.C., 254 F.3d 89, 98 (D.C.
Cir. 2001); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527 (where landlord voluntarily ceded
control of rental property to tenant but retained a fee simple ownership interest and other
rights to control, dispose of , and change the use of the property).
150. Id.
151. F.C.C. v. Fla. Power, 480 U.S. at 252-53.
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importantly, the landlord retains rights—albeit limited rights—to
control and use the leased premises. The landlord retains the right to
impose restrictions on the use of the premises by the tenant. For
example, the landlord may prohibit a tenant from operating a
commercial enterprise on the premises, painting the walls of the unit,
installing large appliances such as a washing machine, a dryer, and a
waterbed, and from housing pets on the premises. The individual
rights that make up the landlord’s bundle of rights are severed and
divided up among the parties—namely, the landlord and the tenant.
When a property owner enters into a lease, the owner exercises
152
the right to transfer a stick in the bundle of sticks to the tenant. A
landlord, however, generally does not turn over to a tenant the entire
“use” strand in his or her bundle of property rights, and may retain
limited rights to use the rented property. An owner may rent his or
her property to a tenant yet grant the tenant the privilege to use and
possess only a part of the landlord’s property for the duration of the
lease, or may grant only limited rights of use of the property. Until
the lease expires or is terminated, the property owner has no right to
exclude the tenant from the specific leased premises whatever the
boundaries of the premises may be. Additionally, the landlord must
153
provide the tenant quiet use and enjoyment of the leased premises.
If the Takings Clause is viewed broadly, it applies whenever any
of the individual sticks in a property owner’s bundle of rights is taken
154
without just compensation. Every stick in the bundle of property
155
Consequently, the
rights would be itself private property.
compensation requirement would be triggered by any governmental
regulation that alters the distribution of wealth or is claimed to take
one of the sticks in the bundle of sticks, such as the right to exclude,
156
control, use, derive income from, bequeath, devise, or sell. Courts
routinely decline to find a taking where the government states a
152. Id.
153. See Echo Consulting Services, Inc. v. North Conway Bank, 669 A.2d 227 (N.H.
1995) (holding that an interference that falls short of a constructive eviction, may still
interfere with the tenant’s expectations under the lease and constitute a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment); and see HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 92 (3d ed. 1939); and see; 2 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 139, §
16B-27.
154. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (finding that there was no
compensable taking despite a transfer of wealth from a property owner to a tenant where
a rent control statute and another housing statute limited a property owner’s ability to
evict tenants and set rents and below-market rates. The property owner retained the rights
to sell, devise, bequeath, and to derive income from the mobile home park).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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public interest that promotes the public welfare, safety and morale,
and where such public interest outweighs any burden to the affected
157
property owner. The Commission cites to a U.S. District Court case
in which the court declined to find a taking in the implementation of
the Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”) to a homeowners’
association restrictive covenant setting an age requirement for
158
residents in the community. In that case, the court found that the
relevant FHAA provisions did not constitute a taking and thus did
not trigger compensation, even though the regulation effectively
altered the distribution of property rights and wealth, because the
public interest of promoting the common good sufficiently
159
outweighed any corresponding burdens.
C.

Tenants’ Bundle of Rights Under a Lease

Even though a landlord who leases property retains ownership of
the leased property, the tenant also owns a bundle of constitutionally
160
protected property rights. A lease, however, represents a lesser
estate than ownership in fee simple and is a lesser estate than a life
161
estate. Generally, a leasehold includes only those rights a landlord
gives to a tenant by contract and those rights provided under
traditional property law. A tenant’s right to possess the leased

157. Id.; and see, e.g., Westwood Homeowners Ass’n v. Tenhoff, 745 P.2d 976 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1987) (land use regulation does not effect an unconstitutional taking under the
Fifth Amendment).
158. First OTARD Order, at 19303, ¶ 44 (citing Seniors Civil Liberties Ass’n v. Kemp,
761 F. Supp. 1528, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (the Fair Housing Act does not effect a taking),
aff’d, 965 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1992), and Westwood Homeowners Ass’n v. Tenhoff, 745
P.2d 976 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
159. Id. (citing Seniors Civil Liberties Ass’n, 761 F. Supp. 1528 and Westwood
Homeowners Ass’n, 745 P.2d 976); see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992)
(finding that there was no compensable taking despite a transfer of wealth from a property
owner to a tenant).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 380 (1945) (“The right
to occupy for a day, a month, a year, or a series of years in and of itself and without
reference to the actual use, needs, or collateral arrangements of the occupier, has a
value.”); see also Goldberg, Merrill, & Unumb, supra note 146 (citing United States v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) and Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367,
377 (1876)); Hicks, supra note 133 (both the landlord and tenant have constitutionally
protected rights).
161. See 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 126, § 39.04; and see
Comments of DirecTV, Inc., Sept. 27, 1996, at 11-12, available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1698920001 (suggesting that the extension
of Rule 1.4000 to tenants produces an unfair result as a life estate holder would be
permitted to install a device while a tenant with a long-term lease would not have the same
privilege, even where the life estate may be of shorter duration).

220

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[26:179

premises encompasses the power to use and control the leased
162
premises. As with a landlord, absent any subsequent transfer to a
third party such as an assignee or a sublessee, for example, a tenant
163
has the right to possess the property. The tenant’s right of
possession also includes the right to exclude others including the
164
landlord and other third parties. While the tenant has the right to
exclude, he or she also has the right to control and use the property
which includes the right to invite visitors, including service providers,
onto the leased property.
Because the lease contract is the source of the property right
under modern law, the landlord can contractually, under the lease,
prohibit certain uses of the premises by the tenant and may, for
example, prohibit hanging laundry on the rails of the balcony and
165
storing articles such as bicycles on the balcony. Therefore, the
tenant does not necessarily exercise complete dominion and control
over the balcony. Landlords can prohibit other types of activity as
well. Also, while the tenant might have the right to possess the leased
property, possession is only one stick of many in the bundle of rights
that define property ownership. It is the landlord who retains the
majority of the sticks in the bundle and who therefore has more rights
with respect to the whole of the property and its uses.
Under property law, a tenant also has a right to live in habitable
conditions. Many states recognize an implied warranty of habitability
166
and a covenant of quiet enjoyment. The implied warranty of
habitability traditionally applies to the bare living essentials such as
167
running water, heat, and operational plumbing. Courts may be
reluctant to apply the warranty of habitability to luxury items. The
right of access to information is not a luxury, but is essential to
modern day existence, and property law must adequately address the
168
modern day relationships of landlords and tenants.

162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Teagarden v. McLaughlin, 86 Ind. 476, 479 (1882) (holding that a tenant
in rightful possession of leased premises may sue landlord for trespass); see also HERBERT
T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 153, § 94 (3d ed. 1939).
164. Id.
165. Second OTARD Order, at 23920 (dissent by Furchtgott-Roth).
166. See, e.g., Marini v. Ireland, 265 A. 2d 526 (N.J. 1976) (residential leases contain an
implied warranty of habitability, under which landlords must provide and maintain vital
facilities).
167. See, e.g., id.
168. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 793-97 (Iowa 1972) (where the court
applies an implied warranty of habitability and recognizes that landlord-tenant law must
keep pace with the changing relationships between landlords and tenants over time).
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D. Application of Rule 1.4000 to Modern Leases

Rule 1.4000 grants tenants the right to install Section 207 Devices
169
on areas over which a tenant has exclusive use or control. Some
scholars and regulators have suggested that this rule is best
demonstrated using an analogy. The analogy contemplates that one
170
could wrap the property in plastic wrap. Anything that penetrates
the plastic wrap is outside the leasehold, while everything within the
171
wrap would constitute the leasehold. Based on this analogy, the
172
balcony and patio are within the leasehold estate. Consequently,
under property law, the landlord no longer has either the right to
possess or the right to occupy the areas covered in plastic wrap—
namely the inside of the rented property as well as the patio and
balcony. This article suggests a different analogy. To adequately
address the practical positioning problems of the Rule as it applies to
apartments in particular, a better analogy may be that a leasehold
should be viewed as a pocket watch with the main part of the
leasehold being represented by the time piece which is connected to
another part of the property that attaches to a common area on which
a Section 207 Device could be installed.
When a landlord leases to a tenant, both parties have certain
expectations under the lease contract. The tenant expects that he or
she will possess and have exclusive use over all others including the
landlord. The landlord, on the other hand, expects to retain the right
to control the use of the property and to protect his or her economic
investment. The tenant, in the landlord’s view, has only the right to
occupy, subject to many restrictions, for a limited period of time.
Therefore, if the landlord has retained the rights to use, dispose of,
exclude, derive income from, and control, the question becomes
which, if any, of these rights has been taken by the government by its
extension of the OTARD Rule to rental property.
Then-Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth dissented in the
Second OTARD Order. Specifically, he dissented from that part of
the order which subjects leased property to regulation under Section
173
207. Furchtgott-Roth saw the lease as the source of all rights for a
tenant and suggested that the scope of the government’s authority to
regulate property was limited only to those rights that the landlord
granted to the tenant under the lease agreement. Furchtgott-Roth
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See Second OTARD Order, at 23896-97, ¶ 43.
See Kessler, supra note 65.
Id.
Id.
Second OTARD Order, at 23919 (dissent by Furchtgott-Roth).
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argued against the FCC’s prescribing what he terms “general
174
federalized lease terms.” The Commission, he argued, may not
175
rewrite the freely negotiated terms of a lease. He argued that
allowing tenants to place devices on a balcony or exterior wall, if
prohibited by the lease, would indeed subject the owner to an
“uninvited” invasion of property. The tenant although not a
“stranger” to the lease, would be an “interloper” acting outside the
rights granted under the lease agreement when the tenant engages in
conduct in violation of the agreed-upon lease terms and restrictions,
even if the device was installed within the boundaries of the leased
176
premises.
Ignoring basic landlord-tenant law, Commissioner FurchtgottRoth focused on occupation and possession rather than the rights of
landlords and tenants under a leasehold. A landlord expressly gives
up the right to possess, occupy and control the leased premises during
177
the term of the lease. The landlord transfers these rights to the
tenant, retaining for him or herself only the right to re-enter the
178
premises at the termination of the lease term. The landlord retains
ownership, but gives up the rights to exclusive use, possession, and
179
control. The Rule does not transfer any additional rights from
landlord to tenant than are already transferred under the lease
agreement. While Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth failed clearly to
explain the relevant distinction between occupation and possession,
property law is clear on this issue. The FCC also supported this
conclusion as evidenced by its responses to inquiries by judges for the
D.C. Circuit, which suggested that the OTARD Rule was “simply
180
[an] entitlement” of tenants. The OTARD Rule protects rights
already granted to tenants.
174. Id. at 23920.
175. The Contract Clause of the Constitution states “No state shall . . . pass any . . .
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .” The purpose of clause was to protect
creditors against debtor relief laws, by which the obligations of debtors were often
postponed or even completely lifted. Any interpretation of a lease agreement after it has
been duly executed by the parties could be found to violate this Contracts Clause. CONST.
art. I, § 10.
176. Second OTARD Order, at 23920 (dissent by Furchtgott-Roth); see also F.C.C. v.
Fla. Power, 480 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1987).
177. Second OTARD Order, at 23919, n. 184 (dissent by Furchtgott-Roth); and see
HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 153, § 76 (3d ed. 1939).
178. See 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 126, § 39.04; and see HERBERT
T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 153, § 76 (3d ed. 1939).
179. Id; and see F.C.C. v. Fla. Power, 480 U.S. at 252-53.
180. SBCA Voices Dissent As Court Grills Landlords and FCC on TV Reception Rules,
SATELLITE WEEK, March 19, 2001.
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Notwithstanding the obvious balance of a landlord’s and a
tenant’s property rights to possess, use, and control, another
interesting balancing of other rights is triggered by the OTARD Rule.
The Supreme Court has held that viewers’ First Amendment right of
access to information includes the right to receive a variety of
181
information from “a multiplicity” of diverse sources. The First
Amendment rights of tenants to receive information must be
182
balanced against the property rights of the property owner. Nothing
in the First Amendment, however, prohibits property owners from
setting limitations on the use of their property through private
183
agreements with others. The Commission agrees that consumers’
and viewers’ access to numerous and diverse sources of information
affords access and exposure to a panoply of perspectives on the
184
relevant social, political, legal, and moral issues of the day. The
Commission correctly concluded that even if we ignore a tenant’s
right to receive information, neither the language of the statute nor
the legislative history suggest that Congress intended Section 207 to
create affirmative duties on property owners by guaranteeing every
American viewer access to the specific programming of their choice
or access to all available programming without considering the
burdens imposed on property owners, other neighbors, and visitors to
185
the property. The problem is, Congress and the FCC should have
ensured the right of all Americans to have access to the wide variety
of programming and data service options currently available, and
should have created some mechanism to compensate property owners

181. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Red Lion
Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see also Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994) (where court reviews constitutionality of FCC’s cable
must-carry rules and acknowledges importance of diverse content and a variety of views
presented on cable and broadcast television).
182. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); and see N.J.
Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 768 (N.J.
1994) (Generally a complainant must show state action in order to support a claim for
impairment of First Amendment rights or equally restrictive actions by a private
individual entity where the property is sufficiently open to the public).
183. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77 (1980); and see
Second OTARD Order, at 23904, ¶ 57.
184. Second OTARD Order, at 23903, ¶ 54 (citing Time Warner Entertainment Co.,
L.P. v. F.C.C., 93 F.3d 957, 975 (1996) (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 389
(1969)).
185. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting, Co., 395 U.S. at 390-93 (holding that the First
Amendment did not require that the political opponents of those endorsed by a broadcast
station be given a chance to communicate with the public via the broadcast station); see
also Second OTARD Order, at 23904, ¶ 56; 104th Congress, 1st Session, Report 104-204,
Part 1 at 123-24 (July 24, 1995).
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or to otherwise create incentives for property owners to voluntarily
provide service. What the Congress cannot do, states could by
extending tenant protections under state law principles, such as the
implied warranty of habitability or provision of vital facilities, or by
186
statute.

VI. Takings Analysis
The purpose of the Takings Clause is “to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
187
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” The
Takings Clause has replaced the Due Process Clause as an effective
means to resolve these issues, as the Takings Clause contains the
188
critical compensation component. In general there are two types of
takings—per se takings and regulatory takings. A per se taking occurs
where the government authorizes the permanent physical occupation
189
of property. A regulatory taking occurs where the government, in
190
exercise of its police power, merely regulates the use of property. A
regulation of economic interests which “goes too far” constitutes a
191
“taking.” Therefore, even if a per se taking is not found, a
governmental action may constitute a regulatory taking. The
extension of Rule 1.4000 to rental property triggers neither a per se
nor a regulatory taking.
A. Per Se Taking

Any permanent physical occupation of real property is a taking
192
regardless of the size of the occupation, the economic impact on the
193
property owner, or any public interest that might be served by the
194
occupation. The per se takings doctrine protects a property owner’s

186. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 793-97.
187. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (government must not
force an individual to bear a burden that would be best borne by the general public).
188. Id. at 934. Manheim suggests that the Due Process Clause was unsuitable for
monitoring the exercise of police power in the area of economic regulation.
189. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-39 (1982);
see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (a government action
that “denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land” is a per se taking).
190. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
191. See, e.g., id. at 415; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenecitis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987) (upholding the rule that regulations that go too far may be deemed
unconstitutional takings of property).
192. Loretto v. Teleprompter, 458 U.S. at 436-37.
193. Id., at 434.
194. Id.. at 426.
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right to exclude all others from its property except in cases where the
195
owner has voluntarily invited others to occupy the premises. Where
a private property owner voluntarily agrees to the possession of its
property by another, the government can regulate the terms and
conditions of that possession without effecting a per se taking, but the
regulation must be analyzed under the ad hoc multi-factor inquiry
196
reserved for nonpossessory regulatory government activity.
A long line of Supreme Court cases address both per se and
regulatory takings. Many of these cases address takings issues within
197
the context of the landlord-tenant relationship. A discussion of the
relevant cases follows. Per se takings cases are discussed first,
followed by regulatory takings cases.
1.

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., found a taking of a portion of a landlord’s property for
which she was entitled to just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
198
Amendment. The Court defined per se takings and affirmed the
traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of property
199
constitutes a taking. In Loretto, a cable company, Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV, obtained permission from the property’s former
owner to install a cable on a five-story apartment building located in
200
New York City. The cable company installed a small cable on the
front and rear of the roof of the building and also attached two large
201
boxes and cables to the roof and masonry using nails and screws.
The State of New York enacted a statute prohibiting landlords from
interfering with the installation of cable television facilities upon his
or her property and prohibiting a landlord from demanding payment
from any tenant in exchange for permission to install cable
195. Second OTARD Order, at 23885, ¶ 22.
196. See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Fla. Power, 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987) (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at
440); see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (setting forth the three ad hoc factual factors for
determining whether a regulation effects a regulatory taking); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (discrimination in places of public accommodation);
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (rent control).
th
197. Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F. 3d 1324, 1327 (11 Cir. 1999); Yee v. City
of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519; F.C.C. v. Fla. Power, 480 U.S. at 252-53; Loretto, 458 U.S. at
441.
198. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438-41.
199. Id. at 440-41.
200. Id. at 421-22.
201. Id. at 422.

226

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[26:179

equipment.202 The law also prohibited landlords from demanding
unreasonable payments from the cable company for the installation
203
of cable equipment. The property owner claimed that the state
statute effected an unconstitutional taking of property without just
204
compensation.
The state statute was upheld by the state court of appeals, which
held the statute served a “legitimate police power purpose of
eliminating landlord fees and conditions that inhibit the development
of CATV, which has important educational and community
205
benefits.” Additionally, in declining to find a taking, the appellate
court found the statute did not interfere with Loretto’s reasonable
investment-backed expectations or present an “excessive economic
206
impact” upon the property owner.
The tenant’s interest clearly is more substantial, consisting of a
right to receive (and perhaps send) communications from and to
the outside world. In the electronic age, the landlord should not be
able to preclude a tenant from obtaining CATV service (or to exact
a surcharge for allowing the service) any more than he could
preclude a tenant from receiving mail or telegrams directed to
207
him.

The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held the cable installation on
the landlord’s property constituted a physical occupation and thus a
taking, because plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws were physically
affixed to the building and occupied space on the building’s roof and
208
exterior wall.
The Loretto Court described property rights in a physical thing
as the rights “to possess use and dispose of it” and recognized a
property owner’s expectation that the owner’s possession and use of
209
the property will be undisturbed by others. The Court found that
the statute more than simply regulated the use of the property
210
pursuant to the state’s legitimate police power. It concluded that
when government directly or indirectly permanently occupies
202. Id. at 423.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 425.
206. Id.
207. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E. 2d 320, 328 (1981),
rev’d, 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (citing testimony of Joseph C. Swidler, Chairman of PSC, before
the Joint Legislative Committee considering the CATV bill, citing Regulation of Cable
Television by the State of New York, Report to the New York PSC by Commissioner
William K. Jones 207 (1970).
208. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. at 438.
209. Id. at 435-36 (citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
210. Id.
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physical property, it destroys or at least infringes upon the property
owner’s rights to possess, use, exclude, and otherwise dispose of the
211
212
property. According to the Court, this constitutes a per se taking.
“Permanent physical occupation of property forever denies the owner
any power to control the use of the property; he cannot exclude
213
others, but can make no nonpossessory use of the property.” It
makes no difference that the owner may retain the right to transfer
the property, the Court opined, because a permanent physical
occupation of the property by a third party “will ordinarily empty the
right of any value, since the purchaser [or any other transferee] will
214
also be unable to make any use of the property.”
The Court made it clear and scholars generally agree that the
Court’s holding in Loretto is “very narrow” and applies only to a
permanent physical occupation by a third party, and that all other
regulations should be analyzed under the three-prong test of Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York discussed in greater
215
detail below in this article. Therefore, not every physical presence
on private property is the type of invasion contemplated in Loretto
216
which would constitute a taking. The Court concluded that an
owner suffers a “special kind of injury” when a third-party stranger
217
rather than a tenant directly occupies the owner’s property.
2.

Yee v. City of Escondido

Yee v. City of Escondido involved a challenge to the City of
Escondido’s mobile home rent control ordinance and answered a
218
question left unresolved by the Loretto Court. The mobile home
park owners argued that when read in conjunction with the state’s
Mobilehome Residency Law, the Escondido city rent control
ordinance amounted to a physical occupation of property, and thus, a
219
per se taking. Under the regulation, park owners could no longer set
220
rents or select their tenants. Pursuant to the state Mobilehome
Residency Law, a park owner was limited in his or her ability to
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. Temporary restrictions on the right to exclude are distinguished from
permanent, exclusive physical occupations.
215. Id. at 441; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
216. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. at 441.
217. Id. at 436.
218. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
219. See id. at 523 .
220. See id. at 526.
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terminate the tenancy of a mobile home owner.221 Specifically, a park
owner could not require removal of a mobile home that was sold,
222
charge a fee, or disapprove of a potential purchaser. Additionally,
the Escondido rent control ordinance set rents back to 1986 levels
223
and prohibited increases without approval of the city council.
Petitioners in the case argued that because mobile home owners
were protected from eviction under the California Mobilehome
Residency Law, a mobile home owner would become a “perpetual
tenant of the park” who could then receive an unfair economic
windfall should the mobile home owner ever sell the mobile home
because the value of the home was enhanced by the corresponding
224
right to occupy the mobile home pad at a below-market price.
Petitioners concluded that the ordinance transferred an interest in the
property from mobile park owners to the owners of mobile homes
who leased pads in the park which was tantamount to a permanent
physical occupation of that mobile home pad, and thus constituted a
225
per se taking. The Court in Yee acknowledged the redistribution of
wealth caused by rent control statutes, but concluded that the
Escondido ordinance differed from the typical rent control ordinance
which transfers wealth from the landlord to the current tenant and all
future tenants, whereas, the Escondido ordinance transferred wealth
226
only to the incumbent mobile home owner.
The Court affirmed the government’s authority, pursuant to its
police power, to regulate various aspects of the landlord-tenant
relationship “without paying compensation for all economic injuries
that such regulation entails,” even though some of these regulations
227
“transfer wealth from one who is regulated to another.” The Yee
Court further opined that regulation of the terms of a landlord-tenant
relationship does not constitute, on its face, an invasion of the

221. See id. at 524.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 526-27.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 530-32 (Petitioners in Yee cited Footnote 19 in Loretto which suggests if the
statute in question in that case had required landlords to provide cable installation, the
statute “might present a different question from the question before us since the landlord
would own the installation.”) Presumably that ownership of the installation equipment by
the landlord would vest the landlords themselves rather than a tenant or other third party
with rights to manage and control the placement of the equipment.
227. See id.
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landlord’s right to exclude.228 The pivotal fact in Yee was, in the
Court’s view, that mobile park owners had voluntarily entered into a
regulated industry. The Court found, therefore, that because the park
owner voluntarily rented the mobile home pad to a tenant mobile
home owner, the park owner had voluntarily invited the mobile home
owner onto the property and consequently was not subjected to the
sort of forced physical occupation of property and per se taking as
229
contemplated by the Loretto Court. The Court held that the park
owners could not assert a per se taking and had no right to
230
compensation based on their inability to exclude future tenants. The
Court found no “compelled physical occupation,” which had it been
231
present, would have entitled the petitioners to compensation.
Additionally, neither statute compelled park owners to continue
232
renting their property to mobile home owners. Park owners were
free to cease renting the property altogether, and the regulations
allowed them to evict the tenants upon giving six or twelve months
233
notice if they chose to dissolve their rental enterprises.
3.

Federal Communications Commission v. Florida Power

The OTARD Rule bears a striking resemblance to the 1978
234
federal Pole Attachments Act. The Pole Attachments Act, as
originally enacted, required the FCC to set reasonable rates, terms,
and conditions for certain attachments to telephone and electric
235
poles. The Pole Attachments Act empowered the FCC, in those
states in which access rates were not already regulated, to determine
“just and reasonable” rates a utility could charge cable companies for
236
access to its poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way. It provided
that if a utility voluntarily chose to provide access, the rate charged
for that access was subject to FCC regulation.
228. Id. at 527-28 (“A different case would be presented were the statute, on its face or
as applied, to compel a landowner over objection to rent his property or to refrain in
perpetuity from terminating a tenancy.”).
229. See id at 527-28.
230. Id. at 531 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258
(1964) (no unconstitutional taking was found where Congress prohibited race
discrimination by motel owner) and Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978) and rejecting arguments based on Footnote 17 in Loretto suggesting that
owner could avoid the requirements of the statute by ceasing to rent to tenants).
231. Id. at 531-32.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2000).
235. Id. § 224(b).
236. Id.
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When faced with a constitutional challenge to the Pole
Attachments Act, the Supreme Court in Florida Power declined to
find a per se taking because the Pole Attachments Act, as originally
enacted, did not authorize third parties to access utility poles, but
merely regulated the terms of the rental once cable companies and
237
utilities agreed to the rental of space on the utility poles. The Court
reversed the Eleventh Circuit which found that the 1978 Pole
Attachments Act authorized a permanent physical occupation of
238
property. The Court concluded that the act merely authorized the
FCC to review rents charged by the power company which voluntarily
239
leased space to cable companies. Generally, statutes regulating the
economic relationship between a landlord and a tenant do not trigger
240
a compensable per se taking. However, where such a statute
requires the landlord to permit the physical occupation of any portion
of the property by an unrelated third party, a per se taking may be
241
It is “the invitation, not the rent, that makes the
found.
242
difference.”
With respect to the Pole Attachments Act the troublesome socalled occupier of property—the tenant—had already been invited
onto the property by the owner. Nothing in the Pole Attachments Act
gave cable companies a right to occupy space on utility poles, or
prohibited utility companies from refusing to enter into attachment
agreements. The Court relied on case law upholding the
government’s authority to regulate various aspects of the landlordtenant relationship without paying compensation even though the
government’s regulations may effect a transfer of wealth from the
243
regulated party to someone else. The regulation of the terms of the
landlord-tenant relationship, such as rental rates, is permissible and
244
does not trigger a takings analysis. Loretto’s holding was limited to
requirements that a landlord suffer physical occupation of the
245
landlord’s building by a third party. There was no such third party
occupying the property in Florida Power. The only relevant parties
were the property-owning landlord and the tenant who had already
237. F.C.C. v. Fla. Power 480 U.S. 245, 254 (1987).
238. Id. at 250.
239. Id. at 250-51.
240. Id. at 252 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
440 (1982)).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 252-53.
243. See, e.g., Yee, 503 U.S. at 529.
244. F.C.C. v. Fla. Power, 480 U.S. at 290-91.
245. Id.
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been voluntarily invited onto the property. The statute imposed no
246
“required acquiescence” obligations on the property owner.
4.

Gulf Power Company v. United States

The Pole Attachments Act was amended in 1996.247 The amended
Pole Attachments Act of 1996 provides that a utility must “provide a
cable television system or any telecommunications carrier with
nondiscriminatory access to any pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way
248
owned or controlled by it.” In Gulf Power Company v. United
States, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a challenge to the 1996
amendment to the Pole Attachments Act ultimately finding that the
statute authorized a taking of a portion of the utilities’ poles when the
FCC imposed a mandatory access provision on utilities companies
requiring
them
to
provide
telecommunications
carriers
249
The court
nondiscriminatory access to their utility property.
concluded that the statute imposed an affirmative obligation on
250
utilities, creating a form of “required acquiescence.” Such a
mandatory access provision, it stated, effects a per se taking of
property under the Fifth Amendment because under the amended
Pole Attachments Act, a utility must permit a cable company or
telecommunications carrier to occupy space on its poles, ducts,
251
conduits, and rights-of-way. The court went on to say, however, that
the Act is not facially unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment
252
The amended Pole
because it includes a crucial provision.
Attachments Act provides a constitutionally adequate process which
ensures a utility does not suffer that taking without obtaining just
253
compensation.
246. Id. at 252.
247. 47 U.S.C. § 224(f) (2000).
th
248. Id. § 224(f)(1); Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F. 3d 1324, 1327 (11 Cir.
1999).
249. 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1); Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F. 3d at 1337 (finding
that the nondiscriminatory access provision of the 1996 Act authorizes the taking of a
portion of the utilities’ poles when the FCC issues a rent determination order for a
particular set of poles, but that the FCC lacks statutory authority to regulate attachments
on utility poles by wireless carriers and Internet service providers); see also SARA F.
LEIBMAN & ANGELA F. COLLINS, CABLE PROVISION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SERVICES 539, 553 (PLI 2001).
250. Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d at 1327, 1331.
251. Id. at 1328-29, 1331.
252. Id. at 1328-29.
253. Id. at 1337 (the FCC has the authority to determine the compensation a utility is
entitled to receive for providing access. It determines the compensation a utility may
receive for providing access by setting a “just and reasonable” rate within the range of
minimum to maximum rates Congress set forth in the act).
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Application of the Takings Cases to the OTARD Rule

The line of takings cases is troubling to some because the Court
appears to be slowly encroaching more and more on the rights of
property owners. While the Supreme Court’s line of takings cases is
troubling, the Court’s reasoning is understandable, and so is the
Commission’s. The cases and the Commission’s rulemaking
proceeding conclusions are understandable because of the unique
nature between the allocation of property rights between landlords
and tenants under the modern leasehold and because of takings
jurisprudence. In the case of Yee, the Court in effect distinguished
between property that is taken from the landlord’s use and control
and that taken from the landlord which the landlord has already put
254
into the stream of commerce. Not only was the relevant property in
that case placed in the stream of commerce, it was placed within the
realm of a regulated area of commerce. Because the property owner
had already given up the right to possess the property comprising the
leasehold, the ordinance did not compel the park owners to suffer the
physical occupation of their property, and did not effect a per se
physical taking. At least on the face of the regulatory scheme in Yee,
neither the city nor the State compelled property owners, once they
have rented their property to tenants, to continue doing so.
Loretto did not involve a regulation of a landlord-tenant
relationship. Instead it involved the relationship between a property
owner, who also happened to be a landlord and an unrelated third
party. In Loretto, property or property rights were taken from the
property owner and given directly to the cable company, and not one
to whom the property owner had already transferred important
property rights. However, such is not the case with the OTARD Rule.
The OTARD Rule speaks clearly to the landlord-tenant relationship.
The OTARD Rule vests the tenant, not an unrelated third party to
the lease, with a right to install a Section 207 Device. As in Yee, a
landlord subject to the OTARD Rule already has transferred the
relevant important rights to use and to possess to the tenant, and
government is, thereafter, authorized to regulate the terms of the
agreement between the property owners and tenants as it applies to
the placement of satellite dishes.

254. Yee, 503 U.S. at 527-29.
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Congress Did Not Authorize a Taking and Did Not Provide a
Compensation Mechanism

As properly recognized by the Commission and many
commenters in the rulemaking proceeding, Section 207 merely directs
the FCC “to promulgate regulations to prohibit restrictions that
impair a viewer’s ability to receive video programming services
through devices designed for over-the-air reception of television
broadcast signals, multichannel multipoint distribution service, or
255
direct broadcast satellite services.” Congress did not expressly
authorize the Commission to permit the taking of private property
either by expressly granting tenants the right to install Section 207
Devices on common areas, or by granting installation rights directly
to satellite service providers, or by compelling property owners to
256
provide service to their tenants. Additionally, Section 207 does not
257
contain a compensation clause. Because Section 207 does not
contain a compensation clause, the FCC correctly concluded that
Section 207 does not authorize the Commission to read one into the
258
statute either expressly or impliedly. Rules of statutory construction
dictate that the Commission should avoid construing a statute in a
259
way that calls into question the constitutionality of the statute. In
sum, the FCC may not take any of the property rights a landlord has
reserved for himself under the express terms of the lease or any rights
reserved to the landlord under the aforementioned traditional
principles of property law.

255. Telecommunication Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 207 (2000). Reads in relevant part:
Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall,
pursuant to section 303 of the Communications Act of 1934, promulgate
regulations to prohibit restrictions that impair a viewer’s ability to receive video
programming services through devices designed for over-the-air reception of
television broadcast signals, multichannel multipoint distribution service, or
direct broadcast satellite services.
See Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass’n Int’l v. F.C.C., 254 F.3d 89, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see
also 47 U.S.C. § 303(v) (2000).
256. Second OTARD Order, at 23882. Section 207 does not grant eminent domain
authority, nor does the Rule provide a compensation mechanism for private property
taken pursuant to this authority.
257. See Bldg. Owners and Managers Ass’n Int’l, 254 F.3d at 93.
258. Second OTARD Order, at 23882, ¶¶ 17, 44. Chevron analysis applies. Under
Chevron, courts accord substantial deference to administrative constructions of
congressionally enacted statutes. See Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); see also Bldg. Owners and Managers Ass’n Int’l, 254 F.3d at 93-94.
259. See, e.g. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988) (“[w]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”).
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As written, the OTARD Rule does not effect a taking, but as
written, the OTARD Rule fails to fulfill Congress’ objectives. Were
the Rule to be rewritten to extend its protections to common areas
without a compensation mechanism or without a redefinition of
property rights, there may be a constitutional problem. Nonetheless,
the Commission and Congress must go further than it has. A
redefinition or broadening of property rights would accord tenants
broader access without a need for compensation. In the alternative,
the Congress could rewrite Section 207 to provide for compensation
from the government from an OTARD Fund created specifically for
this purpose. Such widespread compensation might be economically
unworkable, but a redistribution of property rights is not impossible.
b.

Rule 1.4000 Extends Property Right Protections to Tenants But Not to
Third Parties

The OTARD Rule does not grant third parties rights of access to
an owner’s property. Such rights are granted directly to the tenant.
Opponents of the OTARD Rule contended in the rulemaking
proceeding that the Rule should not apply to leases at all. They
argued that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by
260
extending the OTARD prohibition to leased property.
Additionally, they argued that Congress did not intend to encompass
tenants within the scope of Section 207, and that the statute’s scope
261
must be limited accordingly. They contended that nowhere in the
legislative history does Congress state or imply that the statute is
applicable to leases, and that if Congress intended Section 207 to
apply to rental property, the legislative history would have made that
clear, especially in light of the large number of apartment dwellers in

260. See generally, Comments of NAHB, Sept. 27, 1996, at 5-6, available at http://
gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1694520001;
Comments of Independent Cable & Telecommunications Association, Sept. 27, 1996, at
iii, 18-20, available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=
pdf&id_document=1694550001; Joint Comments of NAA, Building Owners and Managers
Association, National Realty Committee, Institute of Real Estate Management,
International Council of Shopping Centers, National Multi Housing Council, American
Seniors Housing Association, National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts at
14-15, 22, available at www.fcc.gov.
261. See, e.g., Comments of NAHB, Sept. 27, 1996, at 5-6, available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=169452000
1; and see Comments of Independent Cable & Telecommunications Association, Sept. 27,
1996, at iii, 18-20, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1694550001.

2004]

ARE YOU STILL SETTLING FOR CABLE?

235

the U.S.262 They argued that the legislative history of Section 207
demonstrates that Congress was concerned only with restrictions
affecting property owners such as zoning restrictions and
263
homeowners’ association restrictions. As the Commission correctly
determined, the OTARD Rule must be made applicable to rental
property in order to fulfill the spirit of the statute.
The 1934 Act and the 1996 Act conferred upon the Commission
broad authority to regulate in the area of interstate communications.
The statutes direct the Commission to “perform any and all acts,
make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders . . . as may be
264
necessary in the execution of its functions.” The Rule gives tenants
broad but not unfettered rights to install DBS, MMDS, and other TV
antennas in and around their leased premises. Therefore, opponents
of the Rule also argue that by extending the scope of the Rule to
rental property, landlords will have lost all control over their
265
property, and that a taking of private property will occur on
266
“hundreds of thousands” of properties throughout the country.
Building Managers and Yee support the FCC’s decision to extend
the OTARD Rule protections to tenants. They are all correct.
Because a landlord has a duty not to interfere with a tenant’s
enjoyment of a leasehold during the lease term, and has no right to
possess the leasehold until termination of the lease, and because a
tenant may make alterations to the leased premises so long as the
tenant does not commit waste upon the premises, a landlord may not
267
maintain a takings action where a tenant installs a satellite device.
In the FCC rulemaking proceeding, property owners and opponents
of the Rule argued that extending rules to require property owners to
262. See, e.g., Comments of Independent Cable & Telecommunications Association,
Sept. 27, 1996, at iii, 18-20, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1694550001.
263. See, e.g., Comments of NAA, Building Owners and Managers Association,
National Realty Committee, Institute of Real Estate Management, International Council
of Shopping Centers, National Multi Housing Council, American Seniors Housing
Association, National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts at 14-15, 22, available
at www.fcc.gov (“Congress spoke of preempting zoning laws, homeowners’ association
rules and restrictive covenants because they were perceived to prevent individual property
owners from receiving certain signals—but Congress said nothing about apartment leases
or other restrictions that affect individuals who do not own the premises they occupy.”).
264. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2000); see also 47 U.S.C. § 303(r).
265. SATELLITE WEEK, supra note 180.
266. See Comments of Independent Cable & Telecommunications Association, Sept.
27, 1996, at 2, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=
pdf&id_document=1694550001.
267. See Rumiche Corp. v. Eisenreich, 352 N.E.2d 125, 129 (N.Y. 1976); see also
Thompson Develop., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 413 S.E.2d 137, 142 (W. Va. 1991).
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permit installation on a tenant’s leasehold would permit tenants to
install equipment on property that they do not own, restricting the
property rights of the land owner thereby constituting a per se taking
268
under Loretto as well as a regulatory taking. The rights to possess,
to use, and to dispose of, they argued, are destroyed by an uninvited
269
permanent physical occupation of private property by tenants. But,
they were and are wrong. By leasing property to a tenant, the owner
voluntarily relinquishes to the tenant the rights to possess and use
270
which would include installing a satellite reception device. The
tenant is not a stranger to the landlord’s property, but has been
granted the exclusive right to occupy. The Loretto per se rule does not
apply to the FCC’s regulation, so long as all the FCC is doing is
affecting a landlord-tenant relationship, and does not grant the right
271
to occupy to a third party—namely the satellite service provider.
Opponents also assert that even if a statute such as Section 207
and Rule 1.4000 merely regulate the landlord-tenant relationship, the
government’s action also authorizes the permanent physical
272
occupation of the property by a third party. Even though the tenant
is not himself or herself a third party stranger, the satellite service
provider is such a third party stranger. The space occupied by the
reception devices—for example, the area on the balcony or patio—
would be physically and permanently occupied, landlords argue, by a
third party stranger—the tenant’s satellite service provider. Landlords
contend that such providers or installers are not parties they have
invited onto the property, but rather are strangers to the leasehold.
The only parties to the leasehold are the landlord and tenant. As
such, their argument concludes, Loretto applies to such an occupation
by a satellite service provider, and thus, constitutes a permanent
273
physical occupation triggering the just compensation clause.
268. See, e.g., Comments of NAHB, Sept. 27, 1996, at 5-6, available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=169452000
1; Comments of Independent Cable & Telecommunications Association, Sept. 27, 1996, at
iii,
18-20,
available
at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1694550001; Comments of DirecTV to Further NPRM,
Sept. 27, 1996, at 9, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1698920001.
269. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
270. See Thompson Development, Inc., 413 S.E.2d at 142 (affirming that a landlord
“has no right to possess the leasehold until the termination of the lease”).
271. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. at 440-41.
272. See, e.g., Comments of Independent Cable & Telecommunications Association,
Sept. 27, 1996, at 6, 9, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1694550001.
273. Id.
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Because this third party “stranger”—the satellite service provider—
may not be excluded under the Rule if the current tenant or any
future tenants desire and request service, opponents of the Rule
conclude that it effects a permanent physical taking of property. Their
argument misunderstands Loretto and Yee.
While the Court in Loretto was not asked to answer the specific
question at hand, the constitutionality of the OTARD Rule clearly is
274
supported by its holding. The Commission correctly looks to the
lease to define the agreed-upon boundaries of the leased premises,
but neither the Commission nor the Court is blind to the principles of
property law and the policy justifications for transferring some rights
275
and wealth to a tenant. Any possession of areas outside these
agreed-upon boundaries may accord the property owner a right to
assert a per se takings claim—particularly with respect to occupations
by a third party, but possession, occupation, or use by the tenant or a
third party comporting with the agreed-upon lease terms would not
276
During the lease term,
be relevant to a per se takings analysis.
landlords have little say about whom his or her invited tenant
subsequently invites into or onto the relevant leased property. The
fact that the landlord, building management, or a community
association may enter an area to inspect and/or repair the premises
does not mean that the tenant does not have exclusive use of those
277
leased premises. Likewise, the Commission correctly concludes that
just because a landlord or association may regulate other uses of the
exclusive use areas, such as banning barbecue grills or clothes lines on
balconies, does not mean that a taking occurs when the landowners
themselves are prohibited from restricting devices protected by the
278
OTARD Rule.
The OTARD Rule does not introduce a third party stranger of
279
the sort contemplated by Loretto. Moreover, based on landlordtenant principles of property law, the Loretto Court probably would
274. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419.
275. See Second OTARD Order, at 23884-90, ¶¶ 19-29.
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., Flanders v. New Hampshire Savings Bank, 7 A.2d 233 (N.H. 1939)
(holding that a landlord became a trespasser when entering a tenant’s leased premises
without consent absent a reservation by the landlord of the right to enter or assuming a
duty to repair).
278. See Second OTARD Order, at 23922, n. 189. Furchtgott-Roth correctly argues
that a landlord does not necessarily give up his or her entire right to use the property to a
tenant upon leasing the premises, and that the landlord still has the right to restrict the
tenant’s use of the leasehold premises.
279. Appeals Court Upholds FCC on Over-the-Air TV Receptions Rules, WARREN’S
CABLE REGULATION MONITOR, July 16, 2001.
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not have found a taking had it reviewed the OTARD Rule. Because a
tenant has the right to use and enjoy the leased premises during the
term of the leasehold free from interference by the landlord, a tenant
may invite guests or others temporarily onto the leased premises. This
would include delivery persons and service providers such as those
installing Section 207 Devices. There is no way that landlords can
show that service providers occupy a permanent space on the
property unless landlords could somehow show that the radio waves
transmitted to a Section 207 Device somehow permanently occupy
space on the property owner’s property. No court has taken this
approach.
The landlords have argued that the OTARD Rule broadens the
scope of tenants’ rights beyond those provided in the lease, negating
the landlords’ property rights, and thus constituting a taking of the
280
property owner’s right to exclude and use the property. Unlike the
statute in Loretto which gave a third party, the cable company, the
right to occupy space on the property’s roof that was not leased to the
tenant, the OTARD Rule gives the right to occupy space rented by
the tenant to the tenant rather than to a third party. Therefore, in the
case of the OTARD Rule, there is no physical occupation by a third
party, and thus, no taking. The fact that tenants’ rights are enlarged
beyond the scope of those granted by the lease is a result entirely
within the parameters of the Commission’s authority to regulate the
terms of a lease.
An interesting question would arise if a tenant finds a location on
the premises within his or her exclusive use or control on which to
install a device and then, the landlord wishes to install a wall or plant
a tree or build any other structure or object that would obstruct the
tenant’s unimpeded reception. It is unclear whether the landlord
would be free to interfere in this manner with the tenant’s ability to
receive service. On the one hand, such an action by a landlord
arguably would violate the FCC’s prohibition on impairments to a
viewer’s right to receive an adequate satellite signal, and therefore,
would be prohibited. On the other hand, the OTARD Rule, as
applied to these facts, might be found to constitute a taking. Because
the tenant’s leasehold does not include the airspace between the
satellite transmitter and the Section 207 Device, this space, therefore,
could be considered a common area to which the tenant has no right
of access. Rights to the airspace between the satellite transmitter and
the reception device would be transferred to the satellite service
280. See Bldg. Owners & Mangers Ass’n v. F.C.C., 254 F.3d 89, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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provider who would occupy an area over which the tenant has no
right to possess. As such, the third party service provider would
acquire rights to occupy the owner’s property and trigger a
compensable takings problem. In that case the owner’s obstruction
could be introduced without violating the OTARD Rule and without
creating a compensable takings problem. Otherwise, perhaps the
property owner would be due just compensation.
Commission Furchtgott-Roth denies the relevance of cases
upholding the government’s power to regulate the terms of the
landlord-tenant relationship, and contends that even if the Rule
effects no per se taking, there is a regulatory taking under Penn
281
Central Transportation v. New York City. However, he is clearly
wrong. There are numerous examples of the government, in
exercising its police power, redistributing rights between landlords
282
and tenants. Rent control, building codes, and the implied warranty
283
of habitability are perfect examples. In his dissent to the Second
OTARD Order, he argued that the OTARD Rule does not regulate
“the economic status of landlords with respect to tenants,” but is an
attempt by the Commission to intentionally transfer rights from one
284
private party to another. He underestimates the scope of the
landlord’s consent, and he misunderstands basic principles of
285
property law.
c.

The OTARD Rule Does Not Contain A Required Acquiescence
Directive

The OTARD Rule is not a mandatory access rule as
contemplated by the courts in takings cases, nor does it authorize an
occupation by a third party stranger to the lease. The Rule does not
require landlords to provide service or to make any physical
alterations to the property in order to facilitate the installation of a
Section 207 Device. In light of precedent set by both Yee and Florida
Power, Congress’ and the Commission’s regulation of a single aspect

281. Second OTARD Order at 23919-21, n. 189 (dissent by Furchtgott-Roth). Gulf
Power and Florida Power are on point because a tenant has distinct property rights in
addition to those expressly granted by the lease. Furchtgott-Roth argues that the Rule
“goes too far” in granting tenants rights not granted by the lease. See also Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
282. See, e.g., Yee, 503 U.S. 519; and see Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115
(1982) (denying a landlord the right to refuse to rent to a tenant with minor children).
283. See, e.g., Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 968
P.2d 993, cert. Denied 526 U.S. 1131 (1999) (upholding a city rent control ordinance).
284. Second OTARD Order, at 23921 (dissent by Furchtgott-Roth).
285. Id. at 23919 (dissent by Furchtgott-Roth).
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of the landlord-tenant relationship, where the regulation protects a
286
viewer’s access to satellite service, does not result in a per se taking.
Contrary to views espoused in the rulemaking proceeding, applying
Section 207 to rental property by granting tenants rights to install
satellite dishes on rental property does not turn the OTARD Rule
287
into a mandatory access statute. Access has already been granted
voluntarily by the landlord.
The judicial reasoning in Florida Power and Gulf Power are
288
directly on point and relevant. A landlord’s exercise of his right to
rent property may not be conditioned on being forced to submit to a
permanent, physical occupation of its property without payment of
289
just compensation. Obviously, the government may not compel a
290
landowner to rent private property against his or her will. But a
property owner who voluntarily enters the regulated rental housing
market yields some control. The FCC, by bringing rental property
within the purview of Rule 1.4000, does not require a landlord to
continue to rent its property to tenants, does not affirmatively require
a landlord to provide satellite service, nor does it require landlords to
permit the installation of satellite reception devices on common areas.
The FCC argues that removing restrictions within a leasehold does
not impose a duty on a landlord to relinquish property because the
landlord has already voluntarily relinquished possession of the
291
leasehold by virtue of the lease.
A satellite service provider undoubtedly is such an uninvited
third party as directly related to the landlord, but not as related to
tenants, as tenants have the right to invite guests who are third parties
to the landlord-tenant relationship onto the property. However,
tenants and guests are temporary while the installment of antennas is
of a more permanent nature. Of course at some point, typically at the
end of a lease term, the landlord’s invitation to the tenant expires.
286. Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass’n Int’l, 254 F.3d at 99 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 151,
303(v) (2000)).
287. See, e.g., Comments of Independent Cable & Telecommunications Association,
Sept.
27,
1996,
at
iii,
14,
15,
17-18,
available
at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1694550001. A mandatory access statute is an
affirmative governmental requirement that a property owner provide a third party access
to its property or that it provide some service to persons on their property.
th
288. Fla. Power, 480 U.S. at 254; Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324 (11
Cir. 1999).
289. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 n.
th
17 (1982); see also Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324 (11 Cir. 1999).
290. Manheim, supra note 78, at 996.
291. Second OTARD Order, at 23897, ¶ 43.
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Yet, during the lease term, the tenant is still not a “stranger” to the
lease, and the satellite service provider and its equipment are not
292
“strangers” to the tenant.
The statutory scheme in Florida Power is distinguishable from
Rule 1.4000 because providers installing devices under the protection
of the OTARD Rule are not present at the invitation of the owner.
While tenants are not being forced on the owner under the OTARD
Rule, the third party service providers in a sense are. However,
providers are present at the invitation of the tenant. The statute bears
a similarity to the regulation in Gulf Power because, as a practical
matter, the OTARD Rule does require the landlord to suffer physical
occupation by another party. As long as one tenant in an MDU
desires satellite service, the landlord must permit a third party
satellite service provider to install the requisite reception device on
the owner’s property—albeit on property within the exclusive use and
control of the tenant. Property owners will be forced to permit every
DBS provider, as well as providers of other communications services
to install dishes, antennas and other equipment as long as each
provider can attract the interest of at least one tenant or resident on
293
the premises. As the number of market competitors grows over
time, landlords may have to accommodate more satellite devices, and
a service provider will be able to install a system permanently on the
property owner’s private property and occupy that property so long
294
as it is able to maintain at least one subscriber. But, that is exactly
the spirit of the law and the FCC’s regulatory policy. This type of
market competition and consumer choice is exactly what the FCC has
sought to promote for years in radio, video services, as well as in
landline and cellular telephone service just to name a few. The
difference here is that the third party’s occupation is at the invitation
of the tenant—who clearly is an invited party. The right to possess
and occupy space on the property does not belong to the satellite
service provider or the landlord. The right belongs to the tenant. The
Commission has addressed disputes over the placement and
installation of an excessive number of dishes in some declaratory
rulings after the adoption of the OTARD Rule, but has not entirely

292. Manheim, supra note 78, at 996.
293. The Independent Cable & Telecommunications Association argues that this
ongoing presence on the property would amount to a permanent physical occupation of
the property. Comments of Independent Cable & Telecommunications Association, Sept.
27, 1996, at 5-8, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document =1694550001.
294. See id. at 8, 10.
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foreclosed other state remedies such as recovery under the tort of
295
nuisance law or under state zoning ordinances addressing this issue.
Those opposed to the Rule argue that the fact that the dish might
296
be owned by the tenant does not matter. Just because a tenant owns
a washer and dryer, does not mean that a landlord must permit the
tenant to install them in the leasehold. Courts, however, have not
297
analyzed the third-party stranger concept in this way. They have
been more likely to conclude that because the landlord has consented
to the possession and occupation of the leased premises by the tenant,
and that the landlord has invited the tenant, the government may,
298
therefore, regulate the terms of the invitation. This type of
consensual, invited occupation of the property has been clearly
distinguished from a “permanent physical occupation” contemplated
299
by Loretto. Although a landlord’s lease restrictions are enforceable
property rights, governmental restrictions on the exercise of those
300
rights do not necessarily constitute a per se taking. For example,
“[w]hen a landowner decides to rent his land to tenants, the
government may place ceilings on the rents the landowner can
charge, or require the landowner to accept tenants he does not like,
301
without [creating a taking].”

295. See, e.g., In re Stanley and Vera Holliday, 14 F.C.C.R. 17167 (1999) (where
petitioners installed an overwhelming number of seemingly duplicative reception devices
on their property).
296. Second OTARD Order, at 23893-94, ¶ 37. Footnote 19 in Loretto suggests the
Court may take a different view if the landlord rather than the service provider or the
tenant owned the equipment. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 531-32 (1992) (citing
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258, (1964) and Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)(rejecting arguments based on
Footnote 19 in Loretto suggesting that the owner could avoid the requirements of the
statute by ceasing to rent to tenants).
297. See, e.g., Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 252.
298. See, e.g., id.
299. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
300. United States v. Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 380-82 (1945).
301. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 529(upholding rent control law); see also PruneYard v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that no taking occurred where state constitutional
provision required private property owner to permit individuals to solicit signatures for a
petition protesting a United Nations resolution); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (finding that Congress had the power to prohibit race
discrimination by motel owner without triggering an unconstitutional taking); McAndrews
v. Fleet Bank of Mass., 989 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a statute could modify a
preexisting relationship between parties to lease and finding no unconstitutional taking
upon destruction of one “strand” of the bundle of rights because the aggregate bundle of
rights must be viewed in its entirety); Meadows v. Edgewood Management Corp., 432 F.
Supp. 334 (D. Va. 1977) (upholding the constitutionality of Fair Housing Act).
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The Boundaries of the Leasehold Must Be Redefined and Rule 1.4000
Must Be Extended to Common Areas

The current OTARD Rule represents only a partially fulfilled
obligation. The FCC fulfilled part of its obligation under Section 207
in the First OTARD Order by outlawing governmental and
homeowners’ association rules that impair viewers’ abilities to employ
reception devices. However, the OTARD Rule fails to go far enough
to make wireless service available to all U.S. residents regardless of
wealth or property ownership. The Commission, Congress, state
courts or legislatures must extend the right of tenants to include
access, even if it is limited in nature, to common areas or must require
landlords to provide access to telecommunications and video services
in the same way that landlords are required to provide running water
and other vital facilities. Also, the implied warranty of habitability
and the covenant of quiet enjoyment could be extended by state
courts or legislatures to encompass modern day necessities such as
302
access to telecommunications services—in this case satellite service.
The Commission expressed “sympathy” to all of those viewers it
failed to reach and to those renters who are unable to take advantage
of the Section 207 rules, but ultimately concluded, in its Second
OTARD Order, that Section 207 needed to be limited to rentercontrolled property, as the expansion of its coverage to common and
303
restricted access property would violate the Fifth Amendment. The
FCC realized the constitutional limitations it faced in crafting the
OTARD Rule, and went as far as it could based on current
understandings of the rights of landlords and tenants. The
Commission’s expression of compassion is admirable, but of little
consolation to many of America’s poor and dwellers of MDUs in
304
urban areas.
Understandably, from a constitutional standpoint, the
Commission could only go so far in crafting the OTARD Rule
without creating a constitutional takings problem, and the
Commission’s decision not to extend the OTARD Rule to common
areas is mitigated by rules permitting renters to install Section 207
305
Devices within their leaseholds. On the other hand, as argued by
302. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972) (acknowledging that
relationships between landlords and tenants have changed over time, as have the needs of
the parties to a lease, and invoking an implied warranty of habitability which warrants that
there are no latent defects in utilities vital for minimum living conditions).
303. See Second OTARD Order, at 23906-07, ¶ 60.
304. Id.
305. Second OTARD Order, at 23880, ¶ 13.
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commenters in the Commission’s rulemaking proceeding, the FCC
should focus on the legal and practical difficulties associated with
extending Section 207 rules, not on the personal or economic
306
characteristics of the viewers and consumers. In order to meet its
objectives, the Commission should reconsider the limits in place
under the current regulatory scheme, still keeping in mind that
because property owners have rights not shared by tenants, it does
seem fair and just to place some limits on the extent to which a tenant
may use the property owner’s property.
By implementing the OTARD Rule, the government may be
doing more than merely regulating the terms of the landlord-tenant
relationship or the economic relationship of landlords and tenants.
Arguably, the OTARD Rule does not relate simply to the economic
relations of landlords and tenants but rather works to redistribute
property rights between landlords, tenants, and satellite service
providers. However, if property is wealth, and if property is defined
as a bundle of rights, then under modern landlord-tenant law an
inescapable redistribution of wealth occurs whenever a landlord and
tenant enter into a lease. Under modern landlord-tenant law, a
landlord transfers certain rights to the tenant for the duration of the
leasehold.
How one feels about this wealth redistribution depends on
whether one is giving or receiving wealth. Tenants tend to gain rights
under the OTARD Rule, while landlords are giving away certain
rights. Wealth, however, has for a long time been concentrated in the
hands of a few, and there are numerous high and significant barriers
to entry into the class of property owners. Under the OTARD Rule,
the playing field is leveled somewhat between property owners and
those who rent, in that a tenant is given the right to receive certain
communications services and the related communications and
information that the tenant would not have under contract law.
Wealth via property ownership should not be what stands in the
way of bridging the digital divide between the rich and people of
307
lesser means. Rule 1.4000 helps to bridge the disparities in access to
306. See Cellularvision Comments at 6, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1714140001; Congressional Black Caucus
Letter, dated July 29, 1996, available at www.fcc.gov.
307. As of the end of 2003, the U.S. homeownership rate was only 68.6 percent. See
U.S. Census Bureau, Home Vacancy Survey, Table 5, available at
www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/q403tab5.html; see also Comments of DirecTV,
Sept. 27, 1996, at 5-6, available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1698920001 (Neither “the language or the
policies of Section 207 . . . supports this ‘caste system’.”).
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technology and income based on income or wealth by providing
consumers who rent their residences alternative means of receiving
television service, information, and any emerging technologies that
will be provided via satellite service. In order to achieve the goals of
Section 207, video and data services must be easily accessible by all
Americans regardless of wealth, income, property ownership,
geographic location, and race. A failure to extend Rule 1.4000 to all
Americans, including all tenants, would effectively shut out a large
segment of American society from access to information.
One might ask the question of how much wealth is really
represented by this transfer of rights from landlord to tenant
particularly when the rights transferred are not fee simple absolute
ownership rights of the sort that can be sold for profit. At best, the
tenant could sublease its leasehold and gain a profit from that
308
transaction. In some cases, that could be quite lucrative. However,
the wealth distribution in this case and in most cases is small in
relation to the overwhelming public benefit of making a variety of
information through various sources available to all Americans, not
just those with enough wealth to purchase their residences.
Therefore, while the Rule fails to reach a number of those in the
country, and does transfer wealth from the hands of a few to the
hands of the many, where such transfers occur they are
inconsequential in most cases.
The physical possession complained of in Loretto was on the
building roof, possession of which was not granted to anyone but was
309
retained by the property owner, Ms. Loretto. The facts with respect
to placement of Section 207 Devices pursuant to Rule 1.4000 can be
distinguished from the facts in Loretto. Section 207 Devices,
according to the Rule, must be installed on areas within the exclusive
use or control of the tenant. These areas tend to be balconies or
patios which are part of the tenant’s leased premises. Any
requirement of access to common areas such as rooftops would be
more like the impermissible statutory requirement in Loretto, but not
entirely.
In the rulemaking proceeding, electronics manufacturers, DBS
licensees, broadcasters, and consumer groups argued that antenna
placement on common areas will not constitute a per se taking and
308. See, e.g., Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital, 643 N.E.2d 479, cert. denied, 514
U.S. 1109 (N.Y. 1995) (where tenant entered into numerous consecutive subleases of its
leased premises to its employees under an exemption to a city rent control statute which
was found unconstitutional).
309. See id., at 23884-85.
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can be distinguished from Loretto.310 They argued that antenna
installation in common areas is temporary and in no way permanent,
311
and thus, does not constitute a taking. Rather, the antenna will most
likely be removed when the tenant moves at the expiration of the
lease. Additionally, these commenters argued no taking would occur
if the FCC granted the tenant rather than the service provider the
312
right to own or request installation of the reception equipment.
They distinguished Loretto by the fact that the entitlement is granted
to the viewer and not to the provider of the DBS service who is a
313
third party stranger to the landlord-tenant relationship. Loretto is
inapplicable, they argued, where the tenant, rather than the third
party service provider, owns and installs the reception device subject
314
to the landlord’s control. While they are on the right track, their
argument is not good enough to withstand constitutional muster. In
order for tenants to have access to common areas, access to such
areas must become a recognized property right under property law or
315
some other pro-tenant legislation, such as was the case in Yee.
On the other hand, opponents of any requirement that common
areas be made available to tenants argued that Section 207 does not
expressly authorize the FCC to take private property so that a viewer
316
may install Section 207 Devices. Extension of Section 207 rules to
common and restricted access property would constitute a per se
taking requiring just compensation, and the FCC lacks the explicit

310. See, e.g., Comments of National Association of Broadcasters (“NAB”),
available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document
=1697340001; Reply Comments of DirecTV, Inc., available at http://gullfoss2.
fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1715860001;
Reply
Comments of Pacific Telesis Group, available at www.fcc.gov.
311. See, e.g., Comments of NAB, at 14, available at http://gullfoss2.
fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1697340001 (arguing that
the regulation is only a temporary physical occupation by a tenant who already has a
property right)
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., USSB Comments at 6-7, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/
ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1698850001; but see CAI Comments at
16, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document =1698730001.
314. See, e.g., USSB Comments at 7, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1698850001;
and see
Loretto
v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 n. 19.
315. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
316. See, e.g., Comments of Independent Cable and Telecommunications Associate,
Sept. 27, 1996, at 11, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or_pdf =pdf&id_document=1694550001.
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and implicit takings power.317 They argued that while a landlord
invites the tenant to take possession of the property within the
leasehold, the landlord does not invite the tenant to take possession
318
of common and restricted access areas. Tenants, they argued, are
not invited to possess restricted access areas such as the roof or
exterior walls, and are not granted exclusive or permanent possession
319
of common areas. With respect to placement on common areas, it
does not matter if the rights are given to a tenant and not a third
party. The end result, they argue, is the same. A taking would be
present under current definitions of tenants’ property rights.
Any permanent physical occupation, no matter how small,
320
constitutes a per se taking. The FCC agrees that a rule prohibiting
restrictions on the direct attachment of video reception devices to
common areas such as hallways or recreation areas or to restricted
areas such as building rooftops would constitute permanent access
granted to any number of video service providers, and thus a
permanent physical occupation of property triggering the
requirement of just compensation. Any physical intrusion caused by
the installation of a Section 207 Device may be viewed by opponents
of Rule 1.4000 as more severe than the intrusion in Loretto because in
the case of the OTARD Rule, it could be argued that there is a
permanent physical occupation by service providers who have a
permanent right to occupy so long as a tenant on the property desires
to receive service. Additionally, the provider in the case of Section
207 Devices will occupy a larger amount of space than the cable
company did in Loretto, thus warranting more compensation due to
the landlord.
The Commission was not persuaded by those who argued that
Loretto did not apply as long as the entitlement under Section 207
belonged to the tenant, and not to a third-party stranger to the
321
landlord-tenant relationship. The Commission opined that the
power to exclude others from one’s property is one of the most
treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of rights. Required
acquiescence—which might be affected by interpreting Rule 1.4000 to
require a landlord to permit tenants to install a reception device on a

317. Id. at 12.
318. See, e.g., Joint Comments of NAA, Building Owners and Managers Association,
et al., Sept. 27, 1996, at 9-10, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1698570001.
319. Id.
320. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37.
321. Second OTARD Order, at 23896, ¶ 42.

248

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[26:179

common area—is “at the heart of the concept of occupation.”322 While
this might be true under current understandings of state property
laws, the law must be flexible and must reflect changing times and the
changing needs of individuals. The defined leased premises and the
boundaries of the premises of each leasehold should include a portion
of the common area, if access to such an area is necessary, for the
tenant to install and receive essential telecommunications devices. By
redefining a tenant’s property rights, Loretto would be rendered
relevant but inapplicable. A tenant could be granted a right to a
separate area on the property on which to install a Section 207
Device, and then the OTARD Rule indeed would only be a
regulation of the terms of the lease.
The Commission apparently was comfortable going only so far
constitutionally, by concluding that where a viewer-tenant has
exclusive use or control of the property, or where the property is
within the viewer’s leasehold, a community association or landlord
already is excluded from the space and does not have the right to
possess or use it during the term of the leasehold. The Commission
agreed that the physical occupation of the common and restricted
areas at issue here were very similar to the permanent physical
323
occupation found to constitute a per se taking in Loretto. The use
would be similarly permanent because so long as an individual viewer
wished to receive one of the services covered by Section 207, the
property owner would be forced to accept the installation of the
necessary reception devices.
Contrary to Furchtgott-Roth’s opinion, the FCC may and must
alter property rights created under state law when acting pursuant to
324
Congress’s directive. Perhaps then, the rights under a leasehold
should be redefined. Because the Rule fails to make service available
to everyone, and because the government may redistribute rights
between landlords and tenants, the parameters of the leasehold could
be redefined to include the right to possess a portion of a common

322. Id. at 23892-93, ¶¶ 33-36 (Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 252-53).
323. Id. at 23894-95, ¶ 40.
324. See David E. Bronston & Andrew D. Fisher, FCC Scores Rare Win on Satellite
Dish Rules, N.Y.L.J., August 10, 2001 (citing Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass’n Int’l v.
F.C.C., 254 F.3d 89, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S.
355, 368-69 (1986))); Fidelity Fed. Savings and Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
153-54 (1982) (finding that federal law, including administrative regulations, may preempt
state law even with respect to real property); Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691,
698-700 (1984); N.Y. State Comm’n on Cable Television v. F.C.C., 749 F. 2d 804, 807-08
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (court upholds FCC’s regulatory preemption of state and local satellite
master antenna television (“SMATV”) cable services under certain circumstances).
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area for the purpose of receiving a satellite signal via a Section 207
Device. This would alleviate any potential takings problem with
respect to installations on common areas. Just who should be
responsible for redefining these rights is likely to be controversial.
The right of tenants could be recognized judicially, as attempts by
agencies and legislatures to do so, while not absolutely prohibited,
must pass constitutional muster under a Loretto, Florida Power, or
Georgia Power-type analysis. We would be foolish to expect all
landlords to universally adopt a broader definition of a leasehold, or
to act in their tenants’ interests as is the case at Camfield Estates.
Courts, Congress, and the Commission could carve out an exception
to common law property principles enabling tenants to use common
areas for the receipt of important communications services and
defining such areas as part of a tenant’s leasehold. In order to fulfill
its stated goals, the FCC should bestow new rights upon tenants via
the OTARD Rule or by separate action, absent such action by the
state courts or legislatures.
Because government has the authority to regulate the terms of
the landlord-tenant relationship, a requirement that all leaseholds
contain an implied or express promise that landlords would make
some space on common areas available for the installation of a
Section 207 Device could be viewed as nothing more than a
regulation of the terms of the lease. The government may so regulate.
If property owners choose to rent property, government may allow
them to do so subject to certain restrictions such as zoning, fair
housing, and the provision of vital utilities of which
telecommunications service is one. Perhaps a limit could be placed on
the number of units that could be installed on a common area,
whereas such a limit on the number of devices that could be installed
on an area over which the tenant has exclusive use or control would
be prohibited. This would honor the balance of interests of both
landlords and tenants.
Some commenters argued before the Commission that
PruneYard v. Robins does not permit the Commission to infringe a
325
property owner’s property rights. In PruneYard, the owners of a
privately-owned shopping center sought to exclude a group of student
326
protesters. The FCC disagreed with these parties, but agreed with
the Court in Loretto that, the students in PruneYard were invited to
the shopping center, the invasion of the shopping center was
325. See, e.g., Comments of NAB, at 14, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/
prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1697340001.
326. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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temporary, and the center’s owner had not sought to exclude all
327
persons from the property. Rather, the center was generally open to
328
all wishing to enter. Therefore, the state constitution could require
the center to allow students to bring a card table with them for the
duration of their visit without infringing on the owner’s Fifth
Amendment rights. Tenants subject to the OTARD Rule are
similarly temporary in nature., tTherefore, they should be afforded
access not only to the leased premises but also to common areas for
the purpose of installing satellite dishes. Permitting the tenant to
install a Section 207 Device does not infringe the property owner’s
Fifth Amendment rights.
The Fifth Amendment does not provide for an exception to the
government’s just compensation requirement where a tension arises
329
between Fifth and First Amendment rights. A rental property does
not become a public forum in the same sense as the town square or a
shopping mall just because its owner may serve a public interest by
330
renting available units. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Loretto,
acknowledged the importance of telecommunications services, in
particular cable television, and acknowledged that access to such
services justifies small infringements of a landlord’s real property
331
interests as well as small physical encroachments on the property.
The majority, however, insisted that these cases compel compensation
to the property owner when the right is bestowed upon a stranger.
Still, the Commission has no unbridled authority to take private
property based on an argument that an owner’s Fifth Amendment
property rights are outweighed by a tenant’s First Amendment rights.
Extending the Rule to leased property, however, does not constitute a
taking. Under current understandings of property law, extending the
Rule to common areas is problematic, but not fatal because the
tenant’s occupation is only temporary like that of the protesters in
PruneYard. Current understandings of property law and definitions
of property rights must be challenged as we move toward the Digital
Age.

327. Second OTARD Order, at 23904, ¶ 57.
328. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434 .
329. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 (holding that a permanent physical occupation
of property is a taking without regard to the public interest that it may serve); and see
PruneYard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
330. Manheim, supra note 78, at 1002.
331. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 445 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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B. Regulatory Taking

Even if no per se taking is effected by a governmental action,
332
such governmental action may constitute a regulatory taking.
Regulatory takings cases are those in which the government acting
pursuant to its police power, attempts to regulate an economic
333
interest but “goes too far.” Generally, any economic regulation
affects property rights, but compensation is required only if the
regulation requires an individual private property owner to bear a
334
burden that should be borne by the public at large. But, it is a
widely held view that “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
335
paying for every such change in the general law.” Whether a public
action works a taking ordinarily requires a complex ad hoc factual
assessment of the purposes and economic effects of government
336
actions.
1.

Penn Central Transportation v. New York City

In Penn Central Transportation v. New York City, the airspace
337
above property and “air rights” were at issue. A property owner
claimed that a landmark preservation law imposed obligations on
property owners constituting an unconstitutional taking under the
Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Finding no unconstitutional taking, the
Court held that the imposed restrictions substantially promoted the
general welfare while permitting the property owner to continue
332. Penn Cent. Transp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122-24 (1978).
333. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenecitis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987) (repudiating the result in Pennsylvania Coal, but upholding the rule that
regulations that go too far may still be deemed unconstitutional takings of property);
Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Most cases that arise under the
Takings Clause involve condemnations pursuant to the government’s eminent domain
authority. Categorically, such action is regarded as a taking. See also John J. Constonis,
Presumptive & Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 465, 475-79 (June 1983). Constonsis states that police powers and eminent domain
powers frequently function at “cross purposes.” On the one hand, some commentators do
not object to infringements on private property rights when government seeks to achieve a
public benefit, while other scholars reject the notion of redistributing the wealth between
private property owners and other private citizens as well as between private property
owners and the general public even when the general public welfare is served.
334. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104, 124; see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503
U.S. 519, 523.
335. Manheim, supra note 78, at 934.
336. See Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); see also Yee, 503 U.S. at
523; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
337. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
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profitable use of the property.338 The Court held that a finding of
physical transfer of control was not required to effect a taking and
stated that, although governmental action designating private
property as a landmark restricted the owner’s control of the property,
such a designation also enhanced the economic value of the property
and preserved the owner’s ability to transfer development rights to
339
other parcels it owned. A taking may be found if the regulation is
not reasonably necessary to effect a public purpose or if it unfairly
burdens the owner’s use of the property, compromises the owner’s
340
profit-making objectives, or diminishes the value of the property.
Where the government does not authorize a physical occupation of
property, but merely regulates its use, the following three ad hoc
factors should be analyzed to determine whether a regulatory taking
has occurred: (1) the character of the governmental action; (2) the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant—the extent of
diminution in value of the property caused by the regulation; and (3)
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
341
reasonable investment-backed expectations.
2.

Character of the Government Action

Courts are more likely to find a taking where the government
physically invades private property than where interference with
property rights arises from a governmental action intended to
342
redistribute wealth or promote the general welfare. The Court in
Loretto limited such a finding to permanent physical occupation of
private property by a third-party stranger. Cases after Loretto are
clear, however, that where occupation of property is voluntarily
agreed to by the owner, subsequent government regulation of that
343
relationship is not a government-compelled permanent occupation.
It might be, however, the sort of regulatory scheme sufficiently
invasive to trigger an analysis of the character of the government
action ad hoc factor. This is not the case with the OTARD Rule. The
OTARD Rule is no more invasive than any other government
regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship and is in fact less

338. See id.
339. Id.
340. See id.
341. Id. at 124; see also Yee, 503 U.S. at 519; PruneYard v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 83.
342. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124; United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
343. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
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onerous than rent control and anti-discrimination statutes which
consistently have been upheld.
For instance, any law that forbids a landlord from discriminating
amongst tenants transfers wealth to the tenant without triggering a
compensable taking. Similarly, a law requiring landlords to provide
tenants with utilities and mailboxes transfers wealth and causes a
permanent obligation of landlords to dedicate physical space on their
property for these purposes, but does not constitute a compensable
taking. Government action that invalidates lease restrictions is not a
344
taking under Loretto. The government has broad power to regulate
interests in land and change private contractual relationships that
interfere with valid federal objectives such as prohibiting racially
restrictive covenants or prohibiting covenants forbidding group
345
The fact that legislation disregards or destroys existing
homes.
contractual rights, does not necessarily transform the regulation into
346
an unconstitutional taking. In the case of Rule 1.4000, there
arguably is a transfer of wealth from the landlord to the tenant.
However, there is nothing special about the amount or severity of the
transfer. This statute would result in no more of a taking than a
requirement that landlords provide mailboxes or utility connections
to their tenants.
In preempting all governmental aesthetic regulations of DBS, the
Commission noted that similarly-sized items, such as mailboxes,
basketball hoops and air conditioning units typically are not
regulated. DirecTV’s 18-inch DBS antenna is no larger than various
unregulated items commonly found on apartment
balconies, such
347
as tables, chairs, planters and barbecue grills.
3.

Economic Impact of the Regulation and Investment-Backed
Expectations

The economic impact of Rule 1.4000 may tend to decrease the
value of rental property. On the one hand, property values may
decrease due to damage to the rental property caused by shoddy
344. See id.
345. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive private covenants found to be unconstitutional); Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F. 2d 630
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (racially restrictive covenants are void); Senior Civil Liberties Ass’n v.
th
Kemp, 761 F. Supp. 1528 (M.D. Fla. 1991), aff’d, 965 F. 2d 1030 (11 Cir. 1992); see also
Westwood Homeowners Ass’n v. Tenhoff, 745 P.2d 976 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223-24 (1986) (holding that transactions
are not outside the reach of constitutional power simply because the parties have entered
into a contract).
346. See id.
347. See Reply Comments of DirecTV, Inc., May 6, 1996, at 9, available at http://
gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1606680001.
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installation or de-installation of antennas. Also, returns on investment
may decrease due to the increased exposure to tort liability that could
result from personal and property injuries caused by antennas.
Finally, property values may decrease due to the detrimental effects
on the aesthetics of a landowner’s property. A diminution in value
348
alone, however, is insufficient to constitute a taking. The larger the
diminution in value, however, the more likely government action will
be found to be a taking, while a small diminution in value may more
349
closely resemble a valid exercise of the government’s police power.
There are no bright line tests applicable to those non-categorical
takings cases. Even if Rule 1.4000 caused a diminution in value, it
does not completely upset all economic expectations nor reduce the
value of the property to zero. Property owners still have the right to
use, sell, and derive income from their property—just with certain
constitutional governmental limitations.
How the relevant property is defined becomes important in this
analysis. If the relevant property is defined as the entire rental
property, then no taking will be found because any reduction in value
is likely to be small. Even if the relevant property is every single right
in the bundle of rights, there still is no taking because the property
owner already has voluntarily transferred the right to possess the
property to the tenant. The landlord has reserved all other sticks in
the bundle to himself or herself. Therefore, there is no complete
taking of property.
The government frustrates investment-back expectations in a
350
number of ways. For instance, zoning laws and building restrictions
351
may affect a property owner’s investment-back expectations. With
respect to the OTARD Rule, the only expectations that a landlord
has are the expectation of renting property and the expectation of
collecting rental income. Neither of these expectations is frustrated by
the OTARD Rule. While the property-owning landlord may incur
costs of repairing property due to damage caused by installation of
Section 207 Devices, these costs easily can be passed on to the tenant
in the form of larger security deposits or higher rents to compensate
for higher insurance premiums.

348. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1922); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
349. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (holding that a 100 percent diminution in value
constitutes a regulatory taking).
350. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
351. Id. at 125.
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On the other hand, however, a landowner’s distinct investmentbacked expectations surprisingly may be exceeded. In some sense,
Rule 1.4000 actually enhances the rental value of property. In
addition to other reasons discussed earlier herein, in most cases
landlords can charge higher rents to compensate for potential damage
to property and loss of the right to exclude. For instance, because a
tenant has the protection of Rule 1.4000, he or she may be willing to
pay a premium to rent a dwelling in which he or she may receive a
sufficient satellite signal. Also, all rentals may see an increase in
profits as landlords choose to increase rents thereby raising the
average fair market value of all rentals in the market in an effort to
pass on to tenants the costs associated with damage that may be
caused to property. Not all tenants, however, will cause costly damage
to the property due to installation or de-installation of a covered
reception device. Therefore, landlords could theoretically raise all
rents to account for this potential liability and end up with a revenue
and profit increase.
C.

Judicial and Administrative Review of Rule 1.4000 Uniformly Upholds
the Right to Install OTARDs

The D.C. Circuit, in 2001, specifically addressed extension of the
352
FCC’s OTARD Rule to rental property. To date, this is the highest
court to review Rule 1.4000. The D.C. Circuit found that the FCC had
authority under the 1996 Act to extend the OTARD Rule to leased
353
properties. In Building Owners and Managers Association Int’l v.
F.C.C., landlords’ associations brought a facial challenge against the
FCC’s extension of the OTARD Rule to leased property. Petitioners
argued that the tenant’s use of the premises against the express
wishes of the landlord was an invasion of property rights that the
landlord had chosen to retain, and in effect “enlarged” the tenant’s
354
rights beyond the mutually agreed-upon lease terms. The Court
concluded, however, that the landlord had consented to the
occupation of the property, and that Loretto only applies narrowly to
regulations that require the landlord to suffer a physical intrusion of
the landlord’s property by an unrelated third party stranger to the
355
lease. Tenants were not forced on the landlord, therefore the right
352. See Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass’n Int’l v. F.C.C., 254 F.3d. 89, 95 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
353. Chevron analysis applies. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984).
354. Bldg. Owners and Managers Ass’n Int’l, 254 F.3d. at 97.
355. Id.
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to exclude, a stick in the bundle of rights, was not taken by the
356
government. The Court upheld other Court rulings that a tenant
does not become a third-party stranger to the property merely
because the tenant extends an invitation to others to come onto the
357
leased premises. The application of the Rule to leased property was
358
found not to constitute a per se taking of the landlord’s property.
Aside from takings-related challenges to Rule 1.4000, many
challenges have been related to the issue of the impact of Section 207
359
Devices on the aesthetics of the affected private property. Property
owners and landlords certainly have an interest in preserving the
aesthetic appeal of the property owned, particularly with respect to
residential property and commercial retail property, where an
economic interest is closely tied to the beauty and visual appeal of the
property. First, well-groomed and physically appealing property can
bear higher rents and resale value. Prospective tenants and
purchasers most likely will be willing to pay a premium for the
location and aesthetic appeal of a property. Conversely, numerous
scattered antennas may detract from this aesthetic appeal. For
instance, satellite dishes installed on balconies or patios situated on
the front of a building or a side of a building facing an entrance or a
byway may look messy and project an image of clutter and
consequently diminish the property’s value. For instance, an existing
building with balconies on the front of the property which face the
southwest sky may become littered with such reception devices. This
undoubtedly is an eyesore, but the OTARD Rule does not consider

356. See id.
357. See id.
358. See id. at 95.
359. Challenges to the Rule have included objections to the installation of numerous
antennas by a single viewer, the color of equipment and the location of equipment and
devices on highly visible areas of property such as the front of a house. See, e.g., In the
Matter of Daniel and Corey Roberts, 16 F.C.C.R. 10972 (2001); In the Matter of Bell
Atlantic Video Services Co., 15 F.C.C.R. 7366 (2000); In the Matter of Stanley and Vera
Holliday, 14 F.C.C.R. 17167 (1999); In the Matter of Victor Frankfurt, 16 F.C.C.R. 2875
(2001); In the Matter of Otto and Ida M. Trabue, 14 F.C.C.R. 8602 (1999); In the Matter
of James Sadler, 12 Comm. Reg. 1034 (1998); In re Application for Review of Declaratory
Ruling Issued by the Chief, Cable Services Bureau, In re Jay Lubliner and Deborah
Galvin, 13 Comm. Reg. 387 (1998); see also In the Matter of Philip Wojcikewicz, Petition
for Declaratory Ruling Under 47 C.F.R. § 1.4000, CSR-6030-0, DA 03-2971 (2003)
(finding that a town home association restriction against installing satellite dishes on the
roof where the town home owner did not have exclusive use of the roof, was prohibited
even though the association paid for the maintenance and insurance for the roof and even
though adjoining town homes shared a common roof).
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the issue of aesthetics.360 The FCC opined that evaluating the
appearance of a device is not related to the issue of whether a
covered reception device would pose a “legitimate” safety risk to the
361
property owner or to others on the property. Most affected
properties were built and purchased prior to the enactment of the
OTARD Rule, and therefore, their owners were deprived of the
opportunity to factor global satellite positioning into their
architectural designs and placement or into their contract
negotiations when the property was purchased.
The Commission provides in its OTARD Rule a procedure by
which a person or entity seeking to uphold or invalidate a restriction
may file a Petition for Declaratory Ruling with the FCC or a court of
362
The entity seeking to enforce the
competent jurisdiction.
restriction—or to challenge the application of the OTARD Rule—
has the burden of proving that the restriction is valid, regardless of
363
who initiates a proceeding. This burden obviously generally falls on
the property owner, local government, community association, or
364
management company.
The FCC has issued declaratory rulings in a number of cases in
which the Commission reviewed the legality of nongovernmental
365
restrictions in light of various specific factual scenarios. The
decisions of the Commission have almost uniformly struck down local
regulations and private property covenants established by
366
While only one of these cases
homeowners’ associations.

360. See First Order on Reconsideration, In the Matter of Implementation of Section
207 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Restrictions on Over-the-Air Reception
Devices: Television Broadcast Service and Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service, 13
F.C.C.R. 18962, 19006-07, ¶ 11 (1998). The original OTARD Rule considered the
appearance of a reception device in evaluating whether a safety restriction discriminated
against Section 207 reception devices. When the Commission revised its original OTARD
Rule in 1998, it deleted the term “appearance.”
361. Id.
362. 47 C.F.R. § 1.4000 (2004).
363. 47 C.F.R. § 1.4000 (2004).
364. Id.
365. See, e.g., Daniel and Corey Roberts, 16 F.C.C.R. 10972 (2001); Bell Atlantic
Video Services Company, 15 F.C.C.R. 7366 (2000); Stanley and Vera Holliday, 14
F.C.C.R. 17167 (1999); Victor Frankfurt, 16 F.C.C.R. 2875 (2001); Otto and Ida M.
Trabue, 14 F.C.C.R. 8602 (1999); James Sadler, 13 F.C.C.R. 12559 (1998); Jay Lubliner, 13
F.C.C.R. 16107 (1998).
366. See, e.g., Daniel and Corey Roberts, 16 F.C.C.R. 10972 (2001); Bell Atlantic
Video Services Co., 15 F.C.C.R. 7366 (2000); Stanley and Vera Holliday, 14 F.C.C.R.
17167 (1999); Victor Frankfurt, 16 F.C.C.R. 2875 (2001); Otto and Ida M. Trabue, 14
F.C.C.R. 8602 (1999); James Sadler, 13 F.C.C.R. 12559 (1998); Jay Lubliner, 13 F.C.C.R.
16107 (1998).
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tangentially address the issue of whether Rule 1.4000 should be
extended to rental property, the cases do provide insight into the
Commission’s view with respect to the issue of aesthetics and safety.
More importantly, these decisions evidence the Commission’s
commitment to protecting the rights of tenants to receive satellite
367
communications.
1.

In re Stanley and Vera Holliday

In In re Stanley and Vera Holliday,368 the petitioners owned a
single-family dwelling in a planned community subject to plat
covenants and restrictions. The petitioners installed six masts, five
television antennas, and three satellite dishes providing reception for
ten television sets, nine video cassette recorders and seven satellite
receivers. The homeowners’ association had an unwritten policy
limiting each property to one satellite dish antenna and one television
antenna as well as a restrictive covenant requiring approval prior to
installation. The FCC found the absolute limit restriction to be
arbitrary and thus prohibited. The Commission could find no valid
safety basis for the restriction and found the aesthetic concerns
369
insufficient. The Commission did allow a landowner to prohibit
duplicative equipment that is not necessary for a tenant to achieve an
370
acceptable signal and reception of desired video programming.
In 2001, the Court of Appeals of Indiana addressed the issue left
371
unanswered by the Commission’s declaratory ruling. The Indiana
court addressed the issue of whether all of the Hollidays’ satellite
dishes, masts, and antennas were necessary to ensure an acceptable
quality signal on the televisions in the Hollidays’ home or whether the
372
equipment was merely duplicative. The equipment was found by the
Court of Appeals of Indiana to be duplicative, and the court ruled in
373
favor of the homeowners’ association. The Hollidays admitted that
they received all of the television programming they wished to receive
374
on one television in their master bedroom. The additional receivers,
therefore, were excessive.

367. Id.
368. Stanley and Vera Holliday, 14 F.C.C.R. 17167 (1999).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Holliday v. Crooked Creek Villages Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 759 N.E.2d 1088,
1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
372. Id.
373. Id. at 1094.
374. Id.
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In re Daniel and Corey Roberts

In In re Daniel and Corey Roberts,375 petitioners installed an
MMDS antenna on a single family home. They argued that in order
for them to receive an acceptable signal, the antenna had to be
installed in a specific location on the property. The neighborhood
homeowners’ association’s rules required approval prior to any
installation of a satellite dish and prohibited dish placement on
property unless the dish was fully screened and not visible from
376
neighboring properties. The Commission stated that, although the
association’s requirement that installations not be visible from
neighboring properties may be permissible, the association could not
377
delay installation while it examined the required screening proposal.
The Commission was not persuaded by the homeowners’
association’s argument that the antenna was for Internet service only
378
and therefore not protected by the OTARD Rule. The Commission
concluded that the OTARD Rule permits antenna users who cannot
receive an acceptable signal in the locations preferred by a
community association to place their antennas in an alternative
379
The
location where they can receive an acceptable signal.
Commission went even further to say that an antenna user need not
be the owner of the property, or have the owner’s permission to
380
install an antenna.
3.

In re Victor Frankfurt

In In re Victor Frankfurt,381 petitioner challenged a community
association’s restriction forbidding the installation of any antenna on
his town home. The FCC reviewed a town home association’s safety
requirements finding some legitimate and others more burdensome
382
For instance, the
than necessary to achieve their objective.
Commission found that the association’s mounting, windload,
grounding, and power line guidelines were intended to accomplish

375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Daniel and Corey Roberts, 16 F.C.C.R. 10972 (2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Victor Frankfurt, 16 F.C.C.R. 2875 (2001).
Id.
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legitimate safety objectives.383 The Commission found, however, that
the prior approval application requirement and the requirement that
384
exterior wiring be hidden were not legitimate.
4.

In re Bell Atlantic Video Services Company

In In re Bell Atlantic Video Services Company,385 Bell Atlantic
was an alternative video service provider challenging a prior approval
requirement and a restriction prohibiting installation of an outside
antenna visible from the front yard of the lot. The FCC found that the
size and placement restrictions and the prior approval requirement
were preempted because they caused unreasonable delay or
prevented installation, maintenance and use, increased costs, and
386
impaired signal reception.
5.

In re James Sadler

In In re James Sadler,387 a condominium renter sought a
declaratory ruling on the installation of a satellite dish on the outside
388
wall of his town home. The renter secured a satellite dish to an
389
exterior wall above the patio doors in the patio area. The dish did
390
not extend above the ceiling of the first-floor condominium unit.
The condominium association required that the dish be mounted out
of sight from the street, but the renter could not receive an acceptable

383. The requirement that the antenna withstand fifty mile per hour winds was
legitimate. Additionally, the requirement that antennas be grounded in compliance with
relevant codes also was legitimate to prevent lightning from traveling. The requirement
that all antennas exhibit a UL (Underwriters Laboratory) label was not legitimate. The
Commission found, however, that as written the restrictions were not enforceable against
petitioner because they lacked specificity with respect to a resident’s compliance.
384. Victor Frankfurt, 16 F.C.C.R. 2875 (2001).
385. Bell Atlantic Video Services Co., 15 F.C.C.R. 7366 (2000).
386. Id.
387. James Sadler, 13 F.C.C.R. 12559 (1998).
388. Sadler did not own the condominium but submitted a letter from the
condominium owner who stated that he supported Sadler’s petition. The Commission
addressed the issue of whether Sadler could file a petition under the Rule even though he
was not the owner of the property. The Commission clearly stated that the Rule applied to
“antenna users who have a direct or indirect ownership interest in the property on which
they desire to install video reception devices.” Because the landlord had consented to
petitioner’s installation of the dish, the Commission reviewed Sadler’s petition as it would
have had the owner himself filed the petition. The Commission noted though that a
different situation would arise if the owner does not consent to the installation. At ¶ 23, n.
50.
389. Id.
390. Id.
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quality signal in an alternative location, and a move would cost him
391
reinstallation charges of $250 to $350.
The parties in this case took on the task of defining what
constituted the renter’s separate interest and leasehold. The
Commission concluded that exterior walls generally are part of the
common area, while interior surfaces of the walls are included as part
392
of the tenant’s separate interest. In this case, however, the
Commission concluded that the exterior of the condominium wall was
part of the patio that was an area within the exclusive use of the
393
tenant. It was not a common area, and thus was covered by Rule
394
1.4000.
The prior approval requirement, the inspection requirement, and
the requirement that a licensed contractor install the dish were found
395
to be impermissible, unreasonable, and costly. The Commission
concluded that while it was reasonable to specify that any contractor
hired to install DBS dishes must carry personal injury and property
damage insurance, the user could not be required to provide the
396
association with documentation of that insurance.
6.

In re Otto Trabue

In In re Otto Trabue, 397 a regulation of a planned community
required prior approval and painting of any satellite dish and
mounting materials, accessories and cables so that the equipment
blended into the background against which it was to be mounted. The
association conceded that its restriction was not founded on safety
concerns and that it could not enforce the required prior approval,
398
but it asserted an aesthetic concern. The petitioner claimed
disparate enforcement of the painting requirement from owner to
owner and the absence of comparable painting requirements for air
conditioning units and trash receptacles that were visible in the
399
community.
391. James Sadler, 13 F.C.C.R. at 12568, ¶ 30 (1998).
392. James Sadler, 13 F.C.C.R. 12559 (1998).
393. Id. at 12567¶ ¶ 12, 24. The Association cited to the California Civil Code § 1351
which states that the common area of a condominium development means the “entire
common interest development except the separate interests therein.” “A separate
interest” means the individual condominium unit.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 12569-72, ¶ ¶ 32-40.
396. Id. at 12571-72, ¶ 40.
397. Otto and Ida M. Trabue, 14 F.C.C.R. 8602 (1999).
398. Id. at 8606, ¶ 11.
399. Id. at 8607, ¶ 16.

262

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[26:179

In resolving the matter, the FCC stated that in general, a
requirement that a satellite dish be painted to blend with the
background would not violate the OTARD Rule, provided the
requirements would not void the manufacturer’s warranty on the dish
400
or impose any other unreasonable expenses. In this case, painting
all of the component parts of the satellite dish such as the cables and
401
accessories, did void the warranty and impose additional costs.
Therefore, the restriction was preempted by the federal OTARD
402
Rule as it applied to painting the cables and other accessories. As to
the dish itself, the Commission found no evidence of an unreasonable
403
delay or interference with the reception of an acceptable signal.
Therefore, the FCC found the requirement that the dish be painted
did not impose an unreasonable cost or impair installation,
404
maintenance, or use of the antenna.
The requirement for prior approval, however, was prohibited by
the OTARD Rule because it may have imposed an unreasonable
405
delay. Due to lack of information in the record, the FCC was unable
to rule on allegations that the association applied the painting
restrictions in a discriminatory manner, but noted that the association
did require screening of air conditioning units and trash receptacles if
406
they were visible from neighboring units.
7.

In the Matter of Philip Wojcikewicz

In In the Matter of Philip Wojcikewicz, 407 an owner of an interior
townhouse bordered on both sides by other units was subject to a
community association restriction prohibiting installation of antennas
on common areas. The owner sought to install an antenna on the roof
of his townhouse, but the association argued that the roof of a
townhouse was a common area and a restricted area not protected by
the OTARD Rule. The owner petitioned the Commission for
declaratory ruling that the association’s prohibition violated the
OTARD Rule.
400. Id. at 8608-09, ¶ ¶ 17-18.
401. Id. at 8609, ¶ 20. A restriction or requirement that would render a manufacturer’s
warranty void would be deemed to impair maintenance and use by imposing unreasonable
expense.
402. Id. at 8609, ¶¶ 19-20.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id., at 8609, ¶ 21.
406. Id. at 8610, ¶ 22.
407. In the Matter of Philip Wojcikewicz, Petition for Declaratory Ruling Under 47
C.F.R. § 1.4000, CSR-6030-0, DA 03-2971 (2003).
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The association contended that the roof was a common area as
the association insured and maintained it, and that the petitioner did
not have exclusive use or control over the roof as any other adjoining
townhouse owner was entitled to use the space as well. The
Commission, however, referred to the petitioner’s deed, which
indicated that the petitioner owned the home and the lot in fee simple
and that the owner had exclusive use of the home and its exterior.
The fact that the roof was burdened by an easement did not defeat
the petitioner’s claim of exclusive use.
Of the cases reviewed by the FCC, only one has involved a
408
dispute between a tenant and a landlord. Rather, most of the cases
thus far have been disputes between homeowners and tenants or
homeowners and community associations. Review of these disputes is
relevant to the extent that they provide guidance on the
Commission’s interpretation of what types of restrictions impose
unreasonable expense or cost or otherwise impair the maintenance,
use, or installation of Section 207 Devices. Additionally, the cases
offer some insight into the nature of the property right a tenant has
with respect to rental property.

VII. Conclusion
What can landlords do? One thing they may do is require all
tenants to pay larger security deposits or raise rents for all tenants to
cover the costs associated with the alleged physical taking that occurs
when a tenant installs a dish on a common area and to cover the cost
of property damage and other liability. Landlords who want to
prohibit all antennas, even those installed on areas over which the
tenant has exclusive use or control, also could exclude balconies and
patios from the leasehold and classify those areas as restricted or
common areas since the outside of the building is itself a restricted
area according to the Rule. Each of these options, however, would
work to limit the access tenants would have to affordable housing and
to advanced technology, and do not further federal goals.
Today, the receipt of a variety of video and data services has
become an indispensable part of the lives of average American
citizens. Furthermore, the ability to receive information provided via
wireless communications services likely will be critical to the nation’s
security. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized in Kleindienst v.
Mandel the right of individuals to receive information despite
Congress’ power to exclude aliens, and State v. Shack recognized that
408. James Sadler, 13 F.C.C.R. 12559 (1998).
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a property owner’s right to exclude often conflicts with the rights of
409
others to receive information. These cases were resolved in favor of
protecting rights to receive information and against a landowner’s
perceived absolute right to exclude others from the landowner’s
property. Therefore, the FCC should take steps to ensure that all
Americans are afforded the same opportunities to receive critical
information and services via satellite regardless of whether they own
or rent property.
Notwithstanding the progress made by the Commission with the
enactment of Rule 1.4000, because of the importance in today’s
society of the ability to gain access to communications services and
the clear policy objectives of Section 207, the Commission must do
more. The FCC’s rulemaking must accord tenants more extensive
rights than its rules currently do. As this article addresses, the
OTARD Rule, as currently interpreted and applied, falls short of
meeting Congress’ mandate. Practically speaking, only those tenants
occupying a rental unit with a balcony or patio oriented toward the
southwestern sky may receive service because there must be an
unimpeded direct line from the satellite transmitting service and a
reception device. Most buildings are fairly equally divided with
apartment units facing opposite each other. Therefore, at best only
half the number of units will be able to receive service. Furthermore,
even those tenants occupying southwest facing units which have no
balcony, patio, or other such area within the tenant’s exclusive use or
control on which to install a reception device, will not be able to
install a device with the protection of Rule 1.4000. Consequently, the
Rule currently fails to reach a large segment of the population that
the Rule is intended to benefit. If the Rule were extended to common
areas, all Americans who desire service would be able to obtain it
provided the relevant property would not qualify for an exception for
safety or a historic landmark designation.
Interpreting Section 207 to grant viewers a right of access to
possess common or restricted access property for the installation of
the viewer’s Section 207 Device, draws strict opposition from those
who argue that extending the Rule in that way would impose on
landlords or community associations a duty to relinquish physical
possession and occupation of property to tenants, and therefore,
constitutes a violation of the Takings Clause since the statute does

409. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); see also State v. Shack,
277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
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not provide for compensation.410 Rule 1.4000 is constitutional as
enacted, as it does not constitute an unconstitutional taking under the
Fifth Amendment. It cannot be overstated, however, that the
Commission cannot fully implement Section 207 until it provides
viewers who do not have exclusive use areas, particularly residents of
MDUs, access to over-the-air reception devices. The Commission
should not limit Rule 1.4000 to landowners, nor should the Rule be
applicable only to areas over which a tenant has exclusive use or
control. Currently, many apartment dwellers are stuck with the
incumbent cable company who might provide limited or poor service,
even with the adoption of the OTARD Rule. In order to fully achieve
Congress’ objectives, all consumers must have meaningful
competitive choices. Satellite service providers can compete with
cable operators only if viewers have access to antennas.
Dwellers of MDUs should have access to common areas.
Unfortunately, requirements that property owners grant access to
common areas or areas outside the exclusive use or control of the
tenant, or that owners provide a central antenna, raise a potentially
significant takings issue. Because Congress did not expressly grant the
FCC the authority to take private property or to provide
compensation for the taking of that property, the opponents of the
OTARD Rule argued in the rulemaking proceeding that the
Commission could not rewrite Section 207, as it applies to rental
property, to somehow make an otherwise unconstitutional statute
411
constitutional. The FCC alone, or in conjunction with the states,
could simply require landlords to provide service or provide a space
for tenants to install a reception device. This space would have to be
designated as part of the leasehold in the same way that a mailbox is.
To address the problem of liability allocation, the FCC or Congress
could establish a fund similar to the aforementioned OTARD Fund,
designed to reimburse property owners for the expenses incurred in
maintaining and repairing common areas. To give full effect to the
goals of Rule 1.4000 without triggering constitutional problems, the
FCC or the states would have to provide some incentive for landlords
and property owners to voluntarily permit tenants to access common
areas such as rooftops. To extend the Rule’s applicability to common

410. See generally Second OTARD Order. Similarly, the statute would not require an
owner to permit a neighbor to install a device on his property if the neighbor could not
receive a sufficient signal on the neighbor’s property.
411. See Comments of Independent Cable and Telecommunications Associate, Sept.
27, 1996, at 8, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=
pdf&id_document=1694550001.
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areas and areas outside the exclusive use and control of the tenant
without such voluntary invitation to a lessee would trigger a
compensation obligation.
Alternatively, if the ability of a tenant to receive such
communications services were equated to the receipt of mail, utility
services, and other vital facilities, perhaps no taking would be found.
State and federal laws routinely require landlords to provide tenants
with utility connections and mail receptacles. These requirements
have not been found to be takings. The law must continue to change
to address modern developments in society. When electricity and
other utilities became widely available, no taking was found.
Similarly, U.S. mail receipt has not always been available to
residential addresses. Now that it is, there is no question that allowing
landlords to claim a compensable taking would be viewed as absurd
and would place a crippling financial burden on the U.S. Treasury.
Moreover, such a claim seems almost laughable. Practically speaking,
the government could never compensate every landlord for such a
taking absent some revenue-collecting initiative such as the proposed
OTARD Fund. Therefore, it is imperative that any Commission
action not be found not to be a taking. To find a taking could
bankrupt the government.
FCC Rule 1.4000 does not violate the Takings Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. No property right is taken. There is no permanent
physical occupation or any complete destruction of rights, as the
rights to use, control, possess, and occupy the relevant property are
transferred from the landlord to the tenant at the time of leasing.
However, the Rule does not fulfill Congress’ goals, meet the needs of
many Americans, nor does it provide incentives for landlords to make
it easier for tenants to receive service. The FCC should be diligent in
its quest to find creative solutions to this problem. The FCC also
could look for other ways to level the playing field between
competitive video and data service providers and to facilitate
providers’ equal access to America’s consumers, while simultaneously
encouraging states to amend state laws to expand tenants’ rights, to
place telecommunications services on parity with essential services
such as utilities, or to require landlords to provide space on common
412
areas on which to install Section 207 Devices. Additionally, the FCC
should encourage industry to develop a better, smaller and less
412. See, e.g., Comments of DirecTV, Sept. 27, 1996, available at http://gullfoss2.
fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=1698920001(suggesting
that the FCC prohibit landlords and cable companies from entering into exclusive
contracts for the provision of television service).
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obtrusive device, looking to the technological advances of more
progressive countries such as Japan for inspiration. Perhaps a solution
to this problem already is in the making.

